UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE ART OF MAKING AND THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEIDEGGER

BY

ANDREW FUYARCHUK

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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

Andrew Fuyarchuk
21 Lafond
Howick
Quebec
JOS 1GO

August 28, 1996.

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled The Art of Making and the Essence of Truth in the Philosophy of Heidegger submitted by Andrew Fuyarchuk in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Associate Professor R. Burch

Professor M. van de Pitte

Professor R. Shiner

Associate Professor E. Callan

August 27, 1996

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KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

BPP	*The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*
SZ,BT	*Being and Time* (*Sein und Zeit*)
ER	*Essence of Reasons*
ET	*The Essence of Truth*
ID	*Identity and Difference*
IM	*An Introduction to Metaphysics*
LH	*Letter on Humanism*
MFL	*Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*
N	*Nietzsche*, Vol. 1
PDT	*Plato's Doctrine of Truth*
PR	*Principle of Reason*
QCT	*The Question Concerning Technology*

The Art of Making and the Essence of Truth in the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger

There is an ambiguity in Heidegger's understanding of Being. On the one hand Heidegger claims that Being is `universal' and `the transcendens pure and simple.'

> Being, as the basic theme of philosophy, is no class or genus of entities; yet it pertains to every entity. Its `universality' is to be sought higher up. Being and the structure of Being lie beyond every entity and every possible character which an entity may possess. Being is the transcendens pure and simple (SZ/38, BT/62).

Although pertaining to every being, Being is not a particular being, or general property of beings as such but a `universal' and in some way beyond all beings and properties of beings. On the other hand, Heidegger claims that Being and time are related essentially.

> Time must be brought to light - and genuinely conceived - as the horizon for all understanding of Being and for any way of interpreting it. In order for us to discern this, time needs to be explicated primordially as the horizon for the understanding of Being, and in terms of temporality as the Being of Dasein, which understands Being (SZ/18, BT/39).

Being is understood essentially in terms of Time and as a temporal horizon of meaning. It is through `time' that Being discloses itself in its universality and as the transcendent.

Yet it is not clear how Heidegger can maintain these claims. The notion of Being as a temporal horizon of meaning seems to reduce Being itself to our temporal understanding with the result that there is no theory of Being other than as a reflection or product of the times. Those critics who think of Being as an eternal idea seem justified in the severity

with which they have criticized Heidegger on this issue.

Martin Buber for example suggests the harsh political consequences of a notion of Being that is understood with respect to time when he writes of Heidegger in The Eclipse of God,

> Heidegger has bound his thought to his hour as no philosopher has done. Can he, the existential thinker, despite all this, existentially wrestle, in opposition to the hour, for a freedom devoted to the eternal and gain it ? Or must he succumb to the fate of the hour, and with it also to a `holy' to which no human holiness, no hallowed standing fast of man in the face of historical delusion, responsibly answers ? The questions I ask are not rhetorical, they are true questions[1].

By thinking of Being with respect to time Heidegger reduces the universality of truth and ethical standards to the `fate of the hour.' Heidegger's own words seem to attest to an appropriation of Being by human beings that is commensurate with Buber's assessment. Heidegger writes,

> Let us think of Being according to its original meaning, as presence. Being is present and abides only as it concerns man through the claim it makes on him. For it is man, open toward Being, who alone lets Being arrive as presence. Such becoming present needs the opening of a clearing, and by this need remains appropriated to human Being (ID/31).

In this passage Heidegger combines the two critical elements of Buber's argument. He refers to Being as `presence', a definite mode of time: "Being is understood in its coming to be as presence, a definite mode of time. Entities are grasped

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[1] M. Buber, The Eclipse of God. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), 103.

in their Being as `presence'; this means that they are understood with regard to a definite mode of time - the `Present'" (SZ/25, BT/47). But in order to arrive as presence, as Heidegger says, Being needs `human Being.' That Being is dependent upon the will of human beings for its coming to be is expressed by Heidegger, "Being `is' not, but Being is there [es gibt], insofar as Dasein exists" (MFL/153). Being when thought of in terms of time seems subject to human limitations, caprice and fancy.

It is however Heidegger's contention that it is by thinking of Being exclusively as an eternal idea that Being is surrendered to the will of human beings. Heidegger thus turns the tables against the tradition of Western philosophy (what he calls Platonism) and argues as follows,

> We have shown at the outset (section 1) not only that the question of the meaning of Being is one that has not been attended to and one that has been inadequately formulated, but that it has become quite forgotten in spite of all our interest in `metaphysics'(SZ/22, BT/43).

Being is `forgotten' by the tradition of Western philosophy insofar as it has, in the course of questioning into the Being of beings, overlooked the meaning of Being in its difference, as Heidegger conceives it, from all beings and properties of beings. As a result of overlooking or not properly formulating the question of the meaning of Being, namely in terms of temporality, Being is confused with a being.

It is the task of this thesis to determine whether or not Heidegger can differentiate the art of making from the essence of Truth. The essence of Truth is the condition that makes it possible for beings to exist and in Heideggerian terminology is called Being. The art of making is the way in which human beings relate to and manifest beings. It includes both speech (logos) and deed (ergon). With respect to bringing a just polis into existence Socrates says, "If we watch a city coming into being in words, we may also see its justice and injustice come into being" (369a)[2]. Heidegger reiterates, "It is in words and language that things first come to be and are" (IM/13). Speech determines beings. By naming beings we make them visible either as they `truly' are, or we speak falsely, and reveal beings as something they are not. Speech that is indifferent to whether it speaks falsely of what is or truly of what is not is opinion. Deed is similarly at issue in the knowledge of justice in the Republic. Adeimantus complains of Socrates's explanations of what is required in order to build a just polis. "So don't dwell on this any longer" and continues, "Try to persuade us that this regime is possible and show us how, and let the rest go" (472). Socrates replies to Adeimantus by educating and raising Glaucon to a vision of the Good. Deed refers to the practical relation we have to beings - the way we behave or how we comport ourselves toward

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[2] Unless otherwise indicated I have used The Republic. Trans. R. Larson, (Illinois: Harlan Davidson, 1979).

beings, for instance, through seeing, hearing and grasping.

The road I will take toward the question of the relation of the art of making to Being will involve a closer examination of the Platonistic criticism of Heidegger, his reply and an explication, in Heidegger's terms, of how the `transcendens pure and simple' is disclosed in terms of time. I have developed the problem as follows.

In chapter I, I present the argument that because Heidegger does not think of the difference between human beings and Being in terms of the sensible-supersensible dichotomy, itself constructed in an act of cognition, it is impossible for there to be, on Heideggerian terms, a standard independent of human powers of making by which to measure truth and ethical conduct. It only follows, so Stanley Rosen argues, that unless the idea of Being is outside time, there can be no difference between the idea and human making. Rosen finds it impossible to understand how one who thinks of Being as time could not but `succumb to the fate of the hour.'

In chapter II, I offer a Heideggerian response to Rosen by way of a critical examination of the Platonistic relation of human beings to Being. Through a detailed examination of the allegory of the cave, Heidegger argues that Being cannot, on the basis of a perceptual relation to beings, be disclosed in its difference from beings. Essentially, it is Heidegger's argument that to think of the Good, true and the real in terms of an inherently perceptible `idea' of the intellect, is to

determine beings in advance to be commensurate with and bound to human intellection. Speech that follows what is seen does not disclose what `is', but produces opinions. Given that Heidegger sees himself in a debate with the tradition on the very objection that is made against his own philosophy, and moreover, that he claims for himself the overcoming of a subjectivism intrinsic to Platonism, I am compelled to enter into a deeper engagement between Heidegger and Plato.

In chapter III, I clarify Heidegger's relationship to Plato as Platonism. I show that the philosophy of Heidegger and Plato converge on key issues and that `whispers' of Heidegger's explicit effort to think of Being in terms of the self are implicit to Plato's philosophy. Although Plato moves beyond the early Greek temporal notion of Being by thinking of it in terms of the self, and thus prefigures to some extent Heidegger's own approach to the question of Being, because the relation is not properly worked out by Plato in that he thinks of Being as an eternal idea Heidegger finds at a critical stage of the Republic the origins of Platonism. Platonism thinks of the self as a subject in relation to beings as ideas. It is a debased form of Plato or Platonism that is the subject of Heidegger's so called `phenomenological destruction.'

In chapter IV, I analyze how Heidegger transforms the way in which to question into the Being of beings. The `transformation' consists of stepping back to the conditions

of Platonistic `truth'. Heidegger claims not to simply establish a `camp' in opposition to Platonism but rather, claims to have an understanding of Being that itself makes possible the Platonistic claims to `truth.'

> What has to be shown is this: temporality is the condition of the possibility of all understanding of Being; Being is understood and conceptually comprehended by means of time (BPP/274).

By uncovering the long forgotten origins of Platonistic `truth' the entire domain and thus terms in which the relationship between human making and Being is conceived is transformed. After analyzing the formal structures of Heidegger's temporal notion of transcendence and how Being is disclosed through the transformed human relation to beings, the objections made by Rosen against Heidegger in chapter I are re-examined.

In the final chapter I assess whether or not Heidegger's way of thinking about the difference between Being and beings can stand up to questions that focus upon the relation of language to truth, ethics and the notion of `being-on-the-way.' Given the breadth of the topic of the thesis, and although I have attempted to be thorough, I do not presume to have set to rest every possible objection.

CHAPTER ONE

Rosen's Critique of Heidegger

There are three prongs to Rosen's critique of Heidegger[3]. Rosen argues that Heidegger's ontology turns Being into nothing and hence cannot licitly distinguish between speech and silence; that Heidegger equates Being and time in such a way as to dissolve any ontological standard into a temporal process of becoming; and hence, that the only positive content Heidegger can give to Being is one that simply reflects the historical situation or spirit of the times. To Rosen then, Heidegger's philosophy is a "species of historicism." By "historicism" Rosen means "the view that rational speech about the good is possible only with respect to the meaning of history"[4]. This relativization of truth and goodness to history is for Rosen nihilistic. I will outline the three prongs of Rosen's critique in turn.

i) Speaking About Nothing:

Rosen intends "to show in a general way that the distinction, introduced by Heidegger, between the ontological and the ontic is impossible"[5]. Heidegger states in a

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[3] I have principally consulted Rosen's work, Nihilism, (New York: Yale University Press, 1969), for a rendering of his criticism of Heidegger on the relation of human beings to Being. Rosen's work The Question of Being. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993) is a critical study of Heidegger's interpretation of Plato and does not bear the same relevance to the topic of the thesis.

[4] S. Rosen, Nihilism, xiv.

[5] Ibid., 41.

preliminary way how Being (Sein) is different from beings (das Seienden).

> In the question we are to work out, what is asked about is Being - that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which [woraufhin] entities are already understood, however we may discuss them in detail. The Being of entities `is' not itself an entity. ... Hence Being, as that which is asked about, must be exhibited in a way of its own, essentially different from the way in which entities are discovered (SZ/6-7, BT/25-26).

Being is that on the basis of which entities are already understoood (also SZ/152, BT/194). It is a context of intelliligiblity that makes it possible for beings to be what they are for us, but is not itself a being. Beings are a determinate object of consciousness, either actual or possible. Being pertains to beings but is different from them. It is not however clear how Being can be exhibited in its difference from beings. Being Heidegger says in the passage qouted above, is "what is asked about." If there is speech about Being, presumably, Being must be an object of consciousness. But if Heidegger is to maintain the difference between Being and beings, this cannot be so. Strictly speaking, Being is not an entity and so it would seem, there is nothing to say about it. Rosen writes of the ontological difference,

> It is impossible because, whatever the nature and revelatory capacities of pre-verbal experience, the significance of such revelations can only be expressed discursively. If the voice of Being is silent or pre-verbal, then the teaching of ontology

has no significance for the ontic world of things[6].

Being cannot be both pre-verbal and verbal without destroying itself. Because Being is either nothing and irrelevant to the ontic world of things, or expressed discursively and thereby undifferentiated from ontic beings, Heidegger's notion of the difference between Being and beings is unintelligble. Martin Buber shares a similar perspective as that of Rosen insofar as he cannot see how there can exist anything other than the existent, beings. "I shall only confess that for me a concept of being that means anything other than the inherent fact of all existing being, namely that it exists, remains insurmountably empty"[7]. If nothing exists other than beings, speech about Being is silence. Rosen concludes, "speech that is indistinguishable from silence is nihilism"[8].

ii) Being is Becoming:

Heidegger invokes a pre-Platonic notion of Being as physis. In interpreting/translating a fragment from Heraclitos, Heidegger writes, "the essence of things loves to hide." In Being, Heidegger finds "both revealing and concealing - not as two different occurrences merely jammed together, but as one and the same"[9]. Being is a temporal

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[6] Ibid., 41.

[7] M. Buber, The Eclipse of God, 73.

[8] S. Rosen, Nihilism, xvii.

[9] M. Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking. Trans. D. Krell, A. Capuzzi. (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 112-113.

process of emergence and withdrawal, of coming to be and passing away. Being then is not an unchanging and stable ground but rather, the process of giving grounds. Rosen contrasts his own position with the early Greek notion of physis or process of emergence.

> Idea presents us with the nature or essence of "what" shows itself and thus serves as a ground or foundation, a standard by which to define the being that exhibits a look of such and such a kind. Phusis, however, is not a standard or a foundation to which one can appeal in order to define the nature or essence, the "genuine" being of a thing. Phusis is a way rather than the nature of the way; it is a free or unpredictable happening and not a standard to which we may appeal but the mysterious presentation of standards, and hence it is the process of the changing of standards, of the "giving" now of one standard, now of another [10].

In this reading of Heidegger, Being is not a stable and unchanging ground by which to define beings but rather is the way in which beings come to be. It is the mysterious presentation of standards but is not itself a standard. Rosen writes of Being and time,

> Time is the horizon within which Being occurs or happens, but as occurrence or happening, Being is radically temporal. Time not merely reveals or "gives birth," but also conceals or "destroys." In conformity with Heidegger's own characterization of his thought as "being under way," Being is itself the ways in which beings come to be and pass away, ... [11].

As a temporal process of emergence, Being perpetually comes to

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[10] S. Rosen, The Question of Being, xvi.

[11] Rosen, Nihilism, 125-126.

be and destroys itself. Rosen concludes from time as a process of becoming that Heidegger has no philosophical position and that his notion of Being is a void that is filled with the `spirit of the times.'

iii) Heidegger's Historicism:

If one combines Rosen's own position that the nature of speech is `ontical', and Heidegger's temporal notion of Being as process, one finds that any attempt to grasp Being as an object of knowledge is futile. Being slips beyond the grasp of ontical speech in the act of speaking about it. Rosen thus seems justified in arguing that Heidegger has no philosophical position.

> Once again put bluntly, in the deepest sense, Heidegger has no doctrine, no philosophical position, no positive teaching. As he himself always emphasized, and as the title of his last book explicitly asserts, his thought has been from the beginning "on the way toward speech" [12].

Heidegger is caught in a vain and hopeless struggle for a horizon, not of meaning, but of <u>meaninglessness</u>. Heidegger's notion of Being is groundless and denies any standard of either truth or ethical conduct. It is a void where the only possible source of positive content are the contingencies of historical existence. Rosen, considering the reduction of Being to the realm of the ontical, or the mistaking of `authentic' Being for a being, remarks,

Nothing is said as to which contemporary

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[12] Ibid., 101.

> possibility is authentic; since the ontological foundations of authenticity result in the identification of the historical situation as our only guide to action, we are encouraged to act in accordance with the spirit of the times[13].

Because it is impossible to conceive of Being in terms of time without conflating Being with the creative will of human beings, anything that happens to be happening could be Being. Were Heidegger to insist upon a transhistorical notion of Being, he would again fall into a contradiction. Leo Strauss, to whom the overall thrust of Rosen's criticism is in debt, makes the distinction between those that are under the spell of historicism and those that analyze it in an "exposition of the essential character of all such views"[14]. Heidegger falls into the latter category but if so, must stand outside history, beyond time, in order for his analysis of historicism or `comprehensive world views' to have any validity. Yet Heidegger's thinking of Being as time denies the possibility of taking a standpoint `beyond time.' Because his thesis cannot be defended trans-historically, Heidegger's claims are self-refuting: the truth of the claim that truth and goodness are relative to history is itself a relativistic claim. Because Heidegger cannot defend his position without subordinating Being to the historical contingencies of

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[13] Stanley Rosen, "Philosophy and Ideology: Reflections on Heidegger". In Social Research, Vol. 35, no.2, Summer, 1968, 282.

[14] Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 25.

existence, he is a nihilist. Rosen defines nihilism as the "the situation which obtains `when everything is permitted'. If everything is permitted, then it makes no difference what we do, and so nothing is worth anything"[15].

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[15] S. Rosen, Nihilism, xii.

CHAPTER TWO

The Heideggerian Response to Rosen

This chapter has two parts. The first concerns the essence of truth and the art of making in Platonism and the second, the epistemological and political implications of Platonism as nihilism.

Part I: Art of Making and the Essence of Truth in Platonism

Rosen understands language to be solely propositional. Language for Rosen points out and merely indicates what `is' and what `is' in Platonism is an idea - that of which we predicate determinate properties. If one restricts one's attention to the picture of reality wherein there is no notion of being beyond the inherent fact of all existing being, `Being' in Heidegger's sense is indeed nothing. Heidegger places himself in the role of the critic and argues,

> He who speaks of nothing does not know what he is doing. In speaking of nothing he makes it into something. In speaking he speaks against what he intended. He contradicts himself. But discourse that contradicts itself offends against the fundamental rule of discourse (logos), against "logic". To speak of nothing is illogical (IM/23).

If Being were the same as an idea, as Rosen contends, it would indeed be correct to argue that Being cannot be pre-verbal or beyond speech and at the same time spoken about. The ontic - ontological distinction would in Heidegger's sense then be an impossibility. In a similar way, if Being were the same as an idea, it boggles the mind how Heidegger could claim that it is the ground of beings. An idea that came and went in a process

of emerging - withdrawal, because its own characteristics were contradictory, would simply self-destruct. Heidegger speaks for his critics and concludes, "What disregards the fundamental rule of thought and also destroys faith and the will to build is pure nihilism" (IM/23).

Language, according to Heidegger however, is not the exclusive way in which to unveil beings. Instead, there is a prior understanding of Being that makes it possible for beings to stand opposed to us such that they can be spoken about. Rosen confuses Being with a being and thus conceals the meaning-complex or understanding of Being that makes his use of language as a tool possible. It is on account of confusing Being and beings that Rosen reasons as he does and thinks of Being in opposition to time and concludes that Heidegger's philosophy is a version of historicism. By turning the tables against Rosen and showing that his conception of Being as an idea ultimately reduces Being to an all too human subjectivity not only are the very terms in which Rosen criticizes Heidegger inappropriate but Rosen is himself shown to be a nihilist. Before entering into the Heideggerian reply to Rosen proper, I define what is meant by Platonism, for which Rosen is a spokesperson, and nihilism.

i) Platonism and Nihilism:

a) Platonism: It is to that aspect of Plato's thought that conforms to a theory of knowledge called Platonism that is the subject-matter of a Heideggerian response to Rosen. In the

essay "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," an interpretation of the allegory of the cave, Heidegger locates in Plato's way of thinking about Being the origins of humanism (PDT/269) and the standard notion of truth as the correctness of representing through an assertion (PDT/266). That such themes are developed from within the scope of Plato's thinking is indicative of the critical possibilities Heidegger finds in one aspect of Plato's philosophy. In his lecture Nietzsche, which deals with the relationship of art to truth, Heidegger writes,

> We say "Platonism", and not Plato, because here we are dealing with the conception of knowledge that corresponds to that term, not by way of an original and detailed examination of Plato's works, but only by setting in rough relief one particular aspect of his work. Knowing is approximation to what is to be known. What is to be known ? The being itself. Of what does it consist ? Where is its Being determined ? On the basis of the ideas as the Idea (N/151).

Heidegger sets in rough relief one particular aspect of Plato's dialogues that was taken by subsequent thinkers to be the exclusive way in which to think about Being. The `concept of knowledge' Heidegger is referring to, put into motion by Plato, thinks of Being as an idea.

> It is historically "present," but not as a historically recollected "consequence" of a piece of didacticism, not even as revival, not even as imitation of antiquity, not even as mere preservation of the traditional. That change of the essence of truth is present as the slowly confirmed and still uncontested basic reality, a reality reigning through everything, the basic reality of the history of the world rolling on and on into its most modern modernity (PDT/269).

`Modern' thinking has not departed from thinking of Being as

an idea and thus is Plato present to us as Platonism. (I explain more thoroughly Heidegger's justification for an interpretation of Plato as Platonism in chapter III.)

b) Nihilism: Nihilism is not despair or the loss of values that had organized one's existence. The latter is a consequence of nihilism. Nihilism is a forgetting and ultimately a denial that Being is forgotten. Heidegger says of Western thinking that, "the truth of Being remains unthought, and not only is that truth denied to thinking as a possible experience, but Western thinking itself, and indeed in the form of metaphysics, expressly, but nevertheless unknowingly, veils the happening of that denial" (QCT/56). The course of Western philosophy has since the time of Plato, been moved by the substitution of one `truth' after another for the truth of Being. Heidegger writes,

> The essence of nihilism lies in history; accordingly, in the appearing of whatever is as such, in its entirety, Nothing is befalling Being itself and its truth, and indeed in such a way that the truth of what is as such passes for Being, because the truth of Being remains wanting (QCT/109).

"Nothing" befalls Being when it is confused with a permanent idea of the intellect. Heidegger returns to Plato's thought in order to lay bear the possibilities that lie within it. When these possibilities are exposed and developed they lead to the most radical forgetting of Being as expressed in the philosophy of Nietzsche.

> Metaphysics as metaphysics is nihilism proper. The essence of nihilism is historically as metaphysics,

> and the metaphysics of Plato is no less nihilistic than that of Nietzsche. In the former, the essence of nihilism is merely concealed; in the latter, it comes completely to appearance. Nonetheless, it never shows its true face, either on the basis of or within metaphysics[16].

The `true face of nihilism' is a possibility that remains implicit and hidden within the metaphysics of Plato. It is the thinking of Being as an idea, originally founded by Plato, and guiding Rosen's critique of Heidegger, that is subject to the following argument that Platonism is nihilism.

ii) The Essence of Truth in Platonism:

In Platonism `truth' is the correspondence of the proposition with the matter or the matter with the proposition. "From ancient times this correspondence is characteristic of truth. Truth was defined as omoiosis, adaequatio, as adequation to something, as measurement by something" (MFL/124). Heidegger however questions the essence of truth as correspondence. He asks by virtue of what is correspondence made possible.

> By their very nature, "truths", i.e., true assertions, refer to something by reason of which they can be consonant (ER/19).

Heidegger is shifting the question from correspondence to the essence, reason or conditions that make `truth' in Platonism possible. By what reason does the proposition correspond with the matter ?

The `reason' for `truth' in Platonism is the Good. A

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[16] M. Heidegger, "Nihilism". In Nietzsche, Vol. IV. Trans. F. Capuzzi, (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), 205.

reason is a cause, ground, a condition that makes it possible for something to be what and how it is, it makes a `true thing true.' Plato writes of the Good,

> Now imagine the image further: I think you'll agree that the sun lends to visible things not only visibility, but also generation, nurture, and growth, though the sun himself is not generation (509b)
>
> Then you must also agree that because of the Good not only is knowability present in knowable things, but also existence and being, even though the Good is not being, but beyond being, surpassing even it in dignity and power (509c).

"`Apollo !' Glaucon cried comically, `What divine transcendence'". In the above passages Plato distinguishes between the Good and beings. I define these terms as follows.

a) Ideas: According to Heidegger beings or ideas are any possible or actual object of consciousness. On Heidegger's interpretation an idea (eidos, Aussehen) is not simply the act of appearing, or how something comes to be, but that aspect of Being that is visible and formed by the act of looking at it. The idea is then not prior to beings with respect to beings themselves but rather with respect to us.

> The eidos as the look, anticipated in the imagination, of what is to be formed gives the thing with regard to what this thing already was and is before all actualization (BPP/107).

The idea is that which is sighted in advance of the coming to be of a being. According to Heidegger "essentia means the what, the idea, that which determines every being in advance as a being..." (MFL/145). A being is formed in the act of looking at it when seeing is aligned with and guided by the

selective attention of the intellect. The ontic priority of the idea is embedded in the etymology of idea: it is derived from the verb eido meaning see and for the Greeks also meant `know.' Heidegger's statement on Greek ontology attests to the ontic priority of the idea, "the look is not grounded in the form but the form, the morphe is grounded in the look" (BPP/106).

b) The Good (Being): The Good is not visible. It is not itself a being but rather is `beyond' beings and yet, it nevertheless pertains to every being in the sense that the Good is the condition of having knowledge about beings. The Good makes it possible for beings to exist and be visible as such. In other words, in order for a proposition to correspond with the matter, the matter is already manifest and stands opposed to us by reason of the Good. Heidegger's gloss on this is that beings come to be and are according to one's understanding of Being. The assertion therefore does not unveil beings primarily, as Rosen presumes, but rather presupposes that they have already unveiled themselves according to Being (BPP/213).

> We heard earlier that every intentional relation has within itself a specific understanding of the Being of the being to which the intentional comportment as such relates. In order for something to be a possible about-which for an assertion, it must already be somehow antecedently given as unveiled and accessible. Assertion does not as such primarily unveil; instead, it is always in its sense, already related to something antecedently given as unveiled. This implies that assertion as such is not knowledge in the strict sense. Some being must be antecedently given as unveiled in

> order to serve as possible about-which of an assertion (BPP/208).

Heidegger, during a lucid interpretation of the allegory explains of Plato's `ground' "Only if we stand in this light do we cognize beings and understand Being" (BPP/284). In order to see, the eye requires an antecendent illumination. Plato writes of the Good, "This, then, which gives unhiddenness to what is known and the ability (to know) to him who knows, this, I say, is the Idea of the Good" (508a,1 in PDT/262)[17]. Heidegger says that the "leading thought is that the Highest Idea puts the yoke between recognizing and what is recognized" (PDT/266). The thought that the Good is the highest idea stands in tension with the thought that the Good is the non-visible condition for having knowledge about beings.

Despite the fact that in so speaking of the Good as the condition of beings Plato seems to have had a latent understanding of transcendence, it is Heidegger's argument that when Plato's understanding of Being is grounded ontologically it is an inherently human-made idea. It is to Heidegger's argument against Platonism as nihilism that I now turn.

Heidegger writes, "What remains left unsaid in Plato is a

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[17] J. Barlow notes that "The translation is for the most part that of Francis MacDonald Cornford, revised in places to coincide with Heidegger's own translation". Heidegger writes of his translation of the Greek into German, "The parentheses in the following translation indicate where it has interpretively gone beyond the Greek text" (PDT/251).

shift in the definition of the essence of truth" (PDT/251). Heidegger argues that Plato transforms the early Greek temporal notion of truth to a permanent idea of the intellect and thereby puts into motion a way of thinking about Being that is fulfilled during the development of Western philosophy as nihilism. I refer to the early Greek notion of truth, in which Plato's thinking is rooted, in order to explain how the understanding of Being is transformed.

c) Early Greek notion of truth: The essence of Being for the early Greeks, by whom I mean primarily Heraclitos, is appearing (physis). "Being means appearing. Appearing is not something that sometimes happens to being. Appearing is the very essence of Being" (IM/101). In Heidegger's interpretation then, appearing in the sense of coming to be visible, or ontologically present, precedes and makes possible the derivative sense of `appear' meaning `seems to be' or `semblance.'

> The essence of Being is physis. Appearing is the power that emerges. Appearing makes manifest. Already we know then that Being, appearing, causes to emerge from concealment. Since the being as such is, it places itself in and stands in unconcealment, "aletheia" (IM/102).

The open region in which beings come to stand is called aletheia[18]. The act of appearing is the ground or openning that

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[18] I have relied upon Heidegger's reading of the early Greek notion of truth. It is defended in Early Greek Thinking. Trans. A. Capuzzi et. al.(New York: Harper & Row Publ., 1975), 102-123.

makes it possible for beings to stand and glow radiantly from in and out of themselves (IM/100). This standing in itself is called presence. Heidegger equates presence with the German Anwesen. Anwesen designates a homestead or an estate (IM/61, also BPP/109). By invoking the German term Heidegger is suggesting that beings that stand in an open region are at home, in their element and stand in themselves.

> Something is present to us. It stands steadily by itself and thus manifests itself. It is. For the Greeks `being' basically meant this standing presence (IM/61).

Beings that come to be under their own power are present, they are like themselves. However, as Rosen points out, a process of emergence is not a being or a determinate object of consciousness. Being itself as physis withdraws in the face of beings in the sense that it recedes as the context within which beings as determinate things appear. Being, as that which makes it possible for beings to be what and how they are, is an emerging-withdrawal.

d) Transformation of Truth: It is Heidegger's argument that in Book VII of the Republic Plato transforms the early Greek essence of truth. That it is a transformation, not a `new creation', is suggested at the first stage of the ascent. Heidegger interprets the condition of the prisoners in the cave.

> What in Greek was at first thought to be the essence of truth in the sense of aletheia, unhiddenness in relation to the hidden (the pretended and the disguised), only this has an essential relation to the image of the cave

underground (PDT/261).

The prisoners dwell in a concealed region that is open to the light. The cave is an enclosure that is open. "The enclosure of the cave, open in itself, and what it surrounds and thus hides, indicate together an outer part, the unhidden, which by day extends in the light" (ibid.) Heidegger finds at the first stage of the ascent evidence of the early Greek temporal notion of truth. Plato departs from and transforms an understanding of truth as aletheia by thinking of Being along the lines of perception. Heidegger assesses Plato's dislcosure Being,

> It [the tradition] starts from the beings and is oriented toward it. It does not start from being [Sein] and does not enter into the questionable nature of its manifestness (IM/86).

In the allegory of the cave Plato attempts to dislcose Being on the basis of what is already unhidden and visible to human perception. The perceptual relation to beings defines intentionality,

> If we recall what we ourselves said about perception, the concept of intentionality can, to begin with, be made clear as follows. Every comportment is a comporting-toward; perception is a perceiving-of. We call this comporting-toward in the narrower sense the intendere or intentio (BPP/58).

In the perceptual-intentional relation to beings the self is understood as a subject in relation to beings as objects.

> If the doctrine of ideas is related to the phenomenon of transcendence, and if the idea is the correlate of intuition, then there is, in the doctrine, a tendency to conceptualize the problem of transcendence along the lines of looking. This

> is prepared already in antiquity and later leads to orienting the problem of transcendence to the epistemological relationship of subject to object (MFL/183, also IM/193).

It is by "conceptualizing the problem of transcendence along the lines of looking" that Plato confuses Being with a being (also PR/55). Plato's transformation of the understanding of Being as a process of concealment and unconcealment to an idea is evident throughout the allegory of the cave. At each stage of the ascent Plato attempts to disclose `Being' by increasing the light underwhich that which is already unhidden is visible. Each stage of the ascent is thus marked by the habituating of seeing to ever greater intensities of light until ultimately, seeing is assimilated to the most unhidden. Heidegger concludes,

> In consequence of this assimilation of perceiving as an idein into an idea, an omoisis subsists, an agreement between recognizing and the thing itself. And so, before aletheia a change in the essence of truth springs forth out of the front rank of the idea and the idein. Truth becomes orthotes, correctness of the ability to perceive and to declare something (PDT/265).

At the height of the ascent seeing is assimilated to the light. From a standpoint that is over and above beings, beings show themselves as they are in themselves. And yet, the light that yokes together seeing and the idea Plato says is an idea, the Idea of all ideas.

Heidegger suggests the transformation of the early Greek notion of truth that has occurred when he writes, "The ambiguity is clearly obvious in the fact that aletheia is

mentioned and treated while at the same time orthes is meant and set as a standard - and all in the same train of thought" (PDT/265-266). Heidegger is not denying that the early notion of Being as unconcealment is not present in some way to Plato's notion of truth, a `transformation' does not negate its origins. Throughout the allegory of the cave, Plato uses the early Greek words for truth (alethes and alethestra), the unhidden and more unhidden. However, at the height of the ascent he introduces the term orthes, meaning correctness. But the terms are not equivalent. Plato writes of the Good, that it is, "the first cause (i.e. the possibility of essence) of all that is correct as well as all that is beautiful." He continues, the Good ought to be "master dispensing both unhiddenness and perceiving" (PDT/266, 517b, 7-c, 5). Unhiddenness Heidegger points out, corresponds to the beautiful and perceiving to the correct. There is then at the height of the ascent a seeming ambiguity in the definition of truth which Plato decides or resolves in favour of correctness. It is both the beautiful or unhidden, and the correctness of perceiving. It is Heidegger's argument that, although not explicitly said by Plato, the unhidden comes under the yoke of the idea. Plato says of the Idea of the Good and I am qouting from Heidegger, "it is itself master dispensing both unhiddenness (to what emerges) and the ability to perceive (the unhidden)" (517c4, PDT/265). Heidegger interprets the passage,

> When Plato says that the idea is the master permitting unhiddenness, he banishes to something left unsaid the fact that henceforth the essence of truth does not unfold out of its own essential fullness as the essence of unhiddenness, but shifts its abode to the essence of the idea. The essence of truth relinquishes the basic feature of unhiddenness (PDT/265).

At the height of the ascent Being, according to the Heraclitean interpretation, as the temporal process of concealment and unconcealment (`physis loves to hide') is forgotten. Plato thinks that Being, the constant and clear light of the sun, is a `permanently present' idea of the intellect. "Plato understands presence (ousia) as idea" (PDT/267).

The tradition calls the permanently present idea, essentia.

> Each being is continuously present in the What of beings. Presence however is really the essence of Being. Being, then, for Plato, has its real essence in its What. Even more recent terminology betrays the conviction that the true esse is the quidditas or the essentia and not the existentia (PDT/262).

Essentia is what is. It always is, `aei on'. Heidegger refers to Socrates and Plato, explaining that while they think that what comes to presence is an essence, "they think what endures as what remains permanently [das Fortwahrende] (aei on)".

> And they find what endures permanently in what, as that which remains, tenaciously persists throughout all that happens. That which remains they discover, in turn, in the aspect (Aussehen) (eidos, idea), for example, the Idea `house'(QCT/30, also IM/193).

The idea, what-being, essentia is that which endures permanently.

d) Conclusion: The ascent passage in Book VII of the Republic, as an attempt to disclose Being, begins from what is already unhidden, an idea or being, and merely intensifies the light underwhich it is visible but in no way departs from a perceptual relation to beings in which the intellect by determining in advance that the `true' is idea forms the things of knowledge. Rosen partakes in the tradition of Platonism and confuses Being with a being and in so doing conceals the context of intelligibility or an understanding of Being that makes it possible to speak about beings. While the "doctrine of ideas was prompted by a transcendence that was as such still latent..."

> it is just as evident that the conception of the doctrine of ideas could not attain the concept of world, because the ideas themselves and the relationship to them consisted solely in the intensification of one particular grasp of beings - and this grasp is intuition [Anschauung] (MFL/182).

An understanding of the world (Being) cannot be acheived by intensifying the light underwhich an already extant being is visible. Instead, in so thinking of Being, it is reduced and bound to a subjective idea of human intellection. When the reason of beings is undifferentiated from a subjective idea all beings are thought of not for themselves but in advance of their appearance and for the idea we have of them. The inherence of making, forming, molding to the perceptual relation to beings is explained by Heidegger,

> All forming of shaped products is effected by using an image, in the sense of a model, as a guide and standard. The thing is produced by looking to the

> anticipated look of what is to be produced by the shaping, forming. It is this look of the thing, sighted beforehand, that the Greeks mean ontologically by eidos, idea (BPP/106).

"All producing is oriented by visual awareness; it is perceptual in the broadest sense" (BPP/122). Naming beings solely on the basis of what is seen reduces the objective standard of truth and goodness to subjectivity. Because Being is concealed and subordinated to the unrestrained freedom of the human will Platonism is nihilism.

Part II: Implications and Consequences

The implications and the consequences I will discuss concern epistemology and the `concrete' or as I prefer to think of the latter, the political.

i) Epistemology:

While I do not claim that the early Greeks expressed the ontological difference in Heidegger's sense, they do not according to Heidegger think of either truth or falsity in terms of the intelligble - sensible realm dichotomy. I will use Heidegger's interpretation of the early Greek notion of truth and falsity as a basis upon which to criticize Platonistic epistemology. This requires that I return to the pre-Platonistic notion of truth and falsity. I then pursue the critical possibilities and explain how Platonism cannot distinguish truth from falsity and second, that it devolves into speaking about nothing.

Heidegger finds an essential belonging together of physis, unconcealment and appearance in the early Greek notion of

truth.

> It has been necessary to show how, on the basis of the Greek interpretation of Being as physis, and only on this basis, both truth in the sense of unconcealment and appearance as a definite mode of emerging self-manifestation belong necessarily to Being (IM/109).

Truth in the sense of unconcealment and appearance belong to Being providing we keep in mind appearance as a definite mode of emerging self-manifestation i.e., where the appearance comes to be in an unconcealed region. The appearance that emerges of its own accord or in its own element is `true'. But the same being can also show itself as it is not, as a false image or semblance of itself.

> To be sure, the apparent or false is a being which is not as it is supposed to be - it lacks something, it is a me on. The apparent and false is not nothing, not an ouk on, but a me on, a being, yes, but affected with a defect (BPP/208).

Being is a process of emergence and does not linger or endure as an appearance. Being withdraws when the appearance comes to be and thus is the appearance rendered non-being. Non-being is not nothing but a semblance and distortion that occurs when beings come to be according to what we have decided about them. Beings then are both self-determining and determined by something other than themselves. In Book V, prior to the ascent passage and thus before the intelligble - sensible realm dichotomy established by Plato, Socrates succinctly contrasts the appearance that is like itself with the appearance that is unlike itself and defines the philosopher as one who can differentiate them.

After explaining that each one is distinct from what it is not, the others, Socrates says,

> So with the just and unjust, the good and the bad and all other forms, each itself is one but by their partnership in actions, bodies, and one another, they show up everywhere and each appears to be many (476).

Each `one' is distinct from what it is not when it is understood, not through a subordination to others or in relations of opposition with them, but in terms of itself. It shows itself as many when it is understood in terms of and for a community of human action. In order to know the one, the being that is like itself, one must therefore be able to differentiate it from the false image. This ability defines the philosopher.

Socrates, while contrasting the philosopher with the hobbyist, refers to the philosopher and asks,

> How about the opposite case - thinking there is a beautiful itself and being able to see both it and the things that participate in it, not supposing the things to be it or it the things - is that living awake or a dream ? (476d).

The philosopher has knowledge. He or she can differentiate Being from beings and thus knows whether or not the being has come to be of its own accord or whether it has come to be for something else. The philosopher can distinguish a true self-showing from a self-distortion. He or she knows whether or not the ground that is determining a being belongs to it or not.

a) Truth and Falsity: Plato it seems wanted to secure and preserve `truth' against withdrawal. In the ascent to the Good

he is hostile to Being as concealment and attempts to grasp Being as an idea. When Being is `eternalized' as an idea, the interplay of concealment and unconcealment is seen not just as a mere world of appearance but, in opposition with the idea, as a `world of becoming', unstable and in motion.

> What is situated in becoming is no longer nothing and it is not yet that which it is destined to become. In view of this "no longer and not yet", becoming is shot through with non-being. Yet it is not pure nothing, but no longer this and not yet that and as such perpetually other. Consequently it looks now this way and now that. It presents an intrinsically unstable aspect. Thus seen, becoming is an appearance of Being (IM/114).

From the standpoint of Being as an idea beings that show themselves first one way and then another are unstable and are, relative to the permanent idea, a process of becoming. Beings in a process of becoming do not accord with the idea and are `non-being.' However, when `truth' is reconceived as correspondence with the idea, because the ground of beings is overlooked, the Platonist cannot distinguish a true likeness from a false image.

Because Being is forgotten, there is no way to distinguish between a true likeness and a false image. The idea Platonists fix upon could be either the one or the other and they would not know it. Socrates therefore asks of those that confuse the idea and Being,

> What about a man who believes there are beautiful things but neither believes in the beautiful itself nor is able to follow another who leads him to the knowledge of it ? Is he awake or living a dream ? Look, isn't it dreaming when a person asleep or awake takes the resemblance of something for the

thing it resembles (476c)

The hobbyist neglects or forgets the Being of beings and thus cannot differentiate what is, the beautiful itself, from the beautiful things that resemble it. He or she lives in a dream. This is not an innocent way of existing. It carries with it a naivite that is brutal because it cannot recognize when it is doing something wrong.

b) Speaking about Nothing: If the Platonist says "You flip hamburgers at McDonald's" it could be true or false. It makes no difference to them - it simply fits the idea they find convenient to produce. At this level of `knowing' anything said is true. In order to falsify what is said, non-being must have some sort of existence that is different from what is said. However, because the Platonist confuses what `is' with what is said, non-being in the sense of a false image cannot exist. By claiming that non-being cannot exist, it exists. If falsity is saying what is, is not or what is not, is, there is nothing the Platonist says that can be falsified. Clearly to escape from this dilemma it will be necessary to differentiate what is said from what exists. Without the existence of non-being in the sense of a false image that can be distinguished from a true likeness, anything said is true. But if anything said is true in the Platonistic sense, one is speaking about nothing.

Socrates says, "each of these manys both is and is not what we call it" (479b). Socrates is taking two steps in one.

In the first place, he speaks in the above passage of the `manys.' The hobbyist names every being, `Being'. Anything that it is seen, is true.

> According to the diversity of viewpoint, the aspect that offers itself changes. Hence the aspect is always one that we take and make for ourselves. In experiencing and dealing with beings, we are always forming views of their appearance. Often we do so without looking closely at the thing itself. In various ways and for various reasons we form a view of the thing. We form an opinion about it. Sometimes the view that we advocate has no support in the thing itself. Then it is only a view, an assumption. We assume a thing to be thus or thus. Then all we have is an opinion (IM/104).

The hobbyist loves the many equally. Whatever is seen `is.' The outcome of this way of thinking of Being is that the `manys' both are and are not what we call it.

Beings show themselves both as they are and are not but the hobbyist cannot distinguish them and thus the same being both is and is not what it is said to be. Because the hobbyist cannot think past the outward appearance or idea he or she cannot distinguish a true self-showing from a false image. Socrates explains,

> "`O excellent man', we will say, `is there one of these many beautiful things that won't also appear ugly ? or one of the just or the holy that won't also appear unjust and unholy ?'"(479).

Socrates is pointing in the above passage to the fact that there is no single account, for instance of the beautiful, that is not equally applicable to the ugly. If Being is an idea, one may be less beautiful than another by six inches and thus be, "six inches less beauty". But one may also be more

beautiful than still another by six inches and thus be at the same time both "six inches less beauty" and "six inches more beauty". The same sensible property accounts no less for what is than its opposite, what is not. Socrates continues, "And large things and small, light ones and heavy - can't they all be called their opposites as well as what we say they are ?" (479b), and Glaucon concludes of the lovers of the many, "So with things: they equivocate, and none can be firmly thought to be or not to be, or to be neither or both" (479c). The account the hobbyist gives of the beautiful is also the account given for the ugly. But the same reason cannot be given for the both beautiful and ugly when Being is an appearance and thus, combining both without knowing it, the opposites collide and meaning is thus destroyed. The hobbyist therefore either creates opinions interminably (i.e., loves the many) in order to avoid the collision of opposites or combines them and falls into silence. This brings me to a concrete example.

ii) Concretizing Epistemic Truth:

The ascent to the Good is said by Plato to be an education of the philosopher-ruler. When Gluacon has been educated according to his own essential nature (Being), he is returned to the city and given the delicate task of making decisions for its internal relations and relations with other cities. It is Heidegger's argument that Plato does not succeed in transcending the city with the result that Glaucon receives

the powers of an office for which he does not have the proper education. I ask what, if not for the whole city does the ruler who is not a philosopher rule, and in addition, how is it that they can justify their rulership ? Both of these questions serve to manifest the Platonistic `principle of reason' in the city.

a) The `Grounds' for Ruling: In the first place, the ruler may rule for as many `Being' as there are ideas. Everything is equal and the plurality of faces that pass in front of them are essentially the same. This sort of neutralization of difference through frivolity is characteristic of the hobbyist in Book V. But it is equally possible that the ruler could slump into the opposite mode of behaviour with an obsession. That is, like the Platonist, they might define the many appearances in terms of and rule for one idea. From the standpoint of the Good, above and `beyond time' the ruler of the `just' city presumes they can look down upon beings and demand that they cough up their reasons for being. At the conclusion of building the fourth city Socrates says, "It isn't impossible, nor are we discussing impossibilities, though we ourselves admit that it's difficult" (499d). Although not human, and probably a joke, it is possible for a city as perfect as a geometrical model to come into being.

There are then two reasons for ruling. On the one hand, the ruler may rule for the many, like the hobbyist in Book V and on the other, as Platonists themselves claim, for the one.

Whichever choice is made, either to proliferate or to consolidate opinion, knowledge of what `is', is a threat and there is a common interest in the neutralization of beings-in-themselves. I call the manner of reasoning that underlies these two modes of being - Plato-hobbyist. There is nothing between them, except reaction and eratic impulses, to prevent a loose oscillation from one position to the other. There is a tendency to grop for a `golden middle' between these extremes in a speech that is at once both mediocre and arrogant.

b) Justification for Ruling: Because the ruler has not transcended the city the definition of what `is', is understood according to any one of the ways in which it has shown itself. This is evident in Book I of the Republic where the three foreigners that Athens has adopted as its own define justice according to one of the ways in which it has already shown itself in the city, that is, according to one convention or another. One of the ways in which it has come to be, as paying back what is owed or harming an enemy, is universalized as the definition of justice. The problem with defining what `is' according to any one of its showings in a community of human action is evident when the reasons are given for choosing it.

Heidegger's statement during the analysis of the ascent passage is indicative, "The idea does not just let something else (behind it) `make an appearance', it itself is what

appears, and it depends upon itself alone for its appearing (PDT/261-262). The idea that depends upon itself alone for its appearing refers to the fact that in Platonism, the reason or Being of beings is the same as a being. In Platonism, to repeat, there is no difference between Being and what is molded by the subject. Heidegger writes of the thinking that is chained the idea,

> Cognition is a kind of representational thinking [Vorstellen]. In this presentation [Stellen] something we encounter comes to stand [Stehen], to a standstill [Stand]. What is encountered and brought to a standstill in representational thinking is the object [Gegenstand] (PR/23).

"Representational thinking", or the cognition of beings as ideas is intertwined with the causal activity of the subject (also PR/55). Beings are `true' when consciousness sets (Stellen) before (vor) itself the object known. "...Being reveals itself as objectness for consciousness, and this at once says: Being brings itself to light as will" (PR/65). In `truth', there is then no difference between what one wants, and what `is.' The reasons, explanations, excuses and justifications are the same as the definitions of justice in Book I. The interlocutors are refuted or silenced by Socrates but this does not mean that there is not frequently another reason, or argument, to which one may defer in order to justify a proposition.

Heidegger writes, "Insofar as being is attributed to the ideas themselves, they are only a reduplication of beings, as Aristotle saw" (MFL/183). Aristotle criticizes Plato and asks

by virtue of what for instance does manness participate in man ? In order to participate in man it would have to be the cause of itself. But to cause itself from out of itself is a manner of bringing forth where what is brought forth (a likeness) is and is not the same as itself (beings in Being). Thinking identity in difference is contrary to the Platonic notion of truth which, Heidegger says, off-setting it with identity in difference, is an equality of sameness (PR/8). Because there is nothing beyond beings and their properties in Platonism, identity in difference or being in Being is reconceived as a contradiction and `truth' becomes an equality of sameness. The equality between beings is acheived by positing suppositions or causes that reduce beings to the same idea. `Manness' can only participate in man by virtue of itself through a replication or representation of itself. In order to cause itself, `manness' must be present again and thus is both cause and effect and so on ad infinitum. There is always another reason to explain why the idea we have of a being is right and thus we are returned to the confluence of what is with what one wants. It would be contrary to the general nature of truth to be wrong. And yet, such reasoning, instantiated by the arguments of Cephalus, is ultimately self-refuting.

Cephalus is of the opinion that justice is paying back what is owed (331). It is evident that the definition of justice is the same as his reasons for being just because, in reply to the question what is the greatest advantage his

wealth has brought him, Cephalus had said that it is not having to lie and that it affords him the honesty of paying back his debts. Cephalus presumes that it is to his advantage to be just, in the sense of returning what is owed. His reasons for being just, to secure his own advantage, and the definition of justice are the same. But this is the source of a contradiction.

Socrates shows with a simple example that what Cephalus thinks is to his advantage is to his disadvantage i.e., returning a sword to a madman. Cephalus does not realize that unless he can transcend the city, he will not have a standard of truth or goodness by which to measure the use he makes of his techne. Unless he can think beyond what is to his advantage, he cannot use his art intelligently or discriminate between those instances when he ought to return what is owed from those when he should not. Despite Socrates's refutation, Cephalus returns to making sacrifices to the gods, as if justice could be bartered and exchanged. Cephalus denies that Being is forgotten even when he is reminded of it. In such a situation where the `truth' is absorbed into the will of a ruler who does not listen; where his or her legislative powers are without restraint and cannot be challenged, there is nihilism. "If everything is permitted, then it makes no difference what we do - and so nothing is worth anything."

CHAPTER THREE

Heidegger and Plato

In this chapter I am interested in clarifying Heidegger's relationship to Plato. I will show how essential elements of Heidegger and Plato's philosophy converge but first, explain Heidegger's interpretation of Plato as Platonism.

i) The Platonism of Plato

Heidegger is not arguing that Plato beleived or held the view that thinking of Being as an idea is reducible to the self. Plato thought to conceive of Being as an eternal idea as a way of differentiating Being from human subjectivity. Heidegger's argument is that, despite Plato's intentions, it is precisely by conceiving of Being as an idea that reduces Being to human subjectivity. Heidegger's inversion of Plato's intentions is acheived through an intepretation of that which is left `unsaid' in Plato's thought. I place Heidegger's approach to Plato within his overall relation to the history of Western philosophy as follows.

Heidegger is the first in the history of Western philosophy to question properly the relation between Being and beings. During an examination of what makes a true thing true in a `usual notion of truth' Heidegger says of the correspondence between a statement and the thing,

> As long as this "relation" remains undetermined and is not grounded in its essence, all dispute over the possibility and impossibility, over the nature and degree, of the correspondence loses its way in a void (ET/123).

The relation of the statement to the thing is determined by one's understanding of Being. Because Heidegger is the first to explain how to disclose an understanding of Being in its difference from beings he is able to uncover that which is left unsaid but nevertheless presupposed by all philosophers hitherto. During his interpretation of a poem by Parmenides Heidegger writes, "The actual interpretation must show what does not stand in the words and is nevertheless said" (IM/162, also PR/71). In regard to Plato, Heidegger re-iterates, "The `doctrine' of a thinker is that which is left unsaid in what he says, to which man is exposed in order to expend himself upon it" (PDT/251). That which is left unsaid by previous philosophers is the way in which Being has been concealed in the very attempt to disclose it. Heidegger indicates his interpretative approach to past thinkers.

> By a repetition of a fundamental problem we understand the disclosure of the primordial possibilities concealed in it. The development of these possibilities has the effect of transforming the problem and thus preserving it in its import as a problem. To preserve a problem means to free and to safeguard its intrinsic powers, which are the source of its essence and which make it possible as a problem[19].

By a repetition of a fundamental problem Heidegger means appropriating and reappropriating the past-present of Platonism. The past to which Heidegger returns is not that of 5th century Athens and nor is the problem of the relation of

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[19] M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Trans. J. Churchill, (Bloomington: Indiana U. Press, 1962), 211.

Being to beings preserved by mere historical curiosity. Heidegger does not enter into the past as a tourist enters a museum to be amused and entertained by what other people have said and done. The problems of the past Heidegger is referring to are present today, they determine and concern human existence. "Greek ontology and its history ... determine the conceptual character of philosophy even today" (SZ/22, BT/43). Because of the persistence of Plato's ontology it is not wrong to criticize Rosen by way of a return to Plato. Rosen, insofar as he thinks of Being as an idea, is a spokesperson of Plato and the ontology that persists as the past-present or Platonism.

ii) Heidegger and Plato

> ...something which was ontically self-evident in the traditional way of treating the "problem of knowledge" has often been ontologically disguised to the point where it has been lost sight of altogether (SZ/32, BT/170-171).

That which was ontically self-evident to the early Greek understanding of Being, is that Being conceals itself. Plato `disguises' the concealment of Being by thinking of it in terms of a permanent idea of the intellect. The temporal notion of Being as concealment is covered over by Plato's ontology. This has already been examined as that aspect of Plato's thought that conforms to Platonism and yet, there is evidence that the thought of Plato and Heidegger intersect in many respects. I will first lay out the general similarities of their thought and then focus upon the central issue.

a) General Similarities: Being and Time opens with a passage from the Sophist.

> For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression "being". We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed (SZ/1, BT/19).

Heidegger, commenting on this passage from the Sophist, says that it is not a mere decoration but is "an indication that the Gigantomachia [war of the giants] relative to the Being of beings broke out in ancient metaphysics" [20]. Whatever the final outcome or manner in which Plato formulated the question of Being, both he and Heidegger give themselves the task to remove it from obscurity and question it as to its meaning. I refer to a second no less crucial passage from Being and Time,

> Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of Being and to do so concretely (SZ/19).

Heidegger gives himself the task of uncovering the experiences from which the concepts that are traded in the work places of contemporary philosophical discourse are derived. Philosophy is therefore not first and foremost an abstract undertaking, a curious way to occupy one's time, but is rather moved by and concerns itself with concrete issues of life, like justice. And who else in the history of philosophy was motivated to such an extent by a profound sense of justice if not Plato ? His dialogues are dedicated to the defense of justice in the

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[20] Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Trans. J. Churchill, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), 248.

realms of love, friendship and `truth' claims. This brings me to the next point.

Plato's dialogues are fraught with confrontations between Socrates and convention masquerading as wisdom. Socrates typically scratches the veneer of the `intelligentsia' and exposes distortion and sophistry. But the method is not completely negative. As a form of `recollection' (anamnesis) it points in a constructive and positive way towards that which is absent in an opinion. Heidegger's `phenomenological destruction' of Platonism, to be examined in Chapter IV, has a similar pattern. The `destruction' is neither a rebuttal nor the position of a reactionary, but an explanation as to how it is possible to express what is given. In this way it `overcomes' an opinion and constructively points to what is beyond yet presupposed by it. Heidegger, while clarifying how Being is prior to beings writes of Plato,

> Understanding-of-Being is a recollection of that which our soul saw previously; that is, previously when the soul still wandered together with God and looked beyond what we now call beings. In the phenomenon of recollection, Plato sees a relation of the understanding-of-Being to time, even though it could only be made clear through the use of a myth (MFL/148).

Unlike Plato, Heidegger does not speak in myths or in an indirect manner but rather, his thinking strives for an immediate intelligibilty. This does not however refute the fact that his own approach to Being, the a priori, takes the path of a recollection. It is a remembrance of Being, a so called `recollective leap forward', that constitutes the

`constructive' dimension of Heidegger's `destruction.'

iii) Plato's Thinking of Being in Terms of the Self

It is most significant that Plato moves beyond the early Greek notion of Being (and in particular that of Heraclitos) by thinking of Being in terms of the self or at least so Heidegger claims. The fact that Plato denies the temporality of Being does not overule the claim that he had a latent understanding of how to disclose Being as Being that prefigures Heidegger's own approach to the question[21]. Heidegger writes of the "doctrine of ideas",

> There can be no doubt that the conception of the doctrine of ideas was prompted by a transcendence which was as such still latent (MFL/182).

Plato had a latent understanding of Being as Being and yet in the final analysis did not explicitly formulate how to access it. The reasons for his forgetting of Being have been outlined in the previous chapter. At this point, I focus upon the evidence that Plato was moving in the direction which Heidegger gave to the problem. Although it would be premature to develop the structure of Heidegger's ontology thoroughly, in order to situate it with respect to what I have to say about Plato, I qoute Heidegger on the question of Being (die Seinsfrage): "The very asking of this question is an entity's mode of Being; and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired about - namely Being" (SZ/7, BT/27). We

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[21] This must be qualified, "it was first stated by Parmenides that Being is related to the subject" (MFL/142).

are the entities to be questioned in the question of Being. That Plato crosses paths with Heidegger on the approach to the question may be evidenced as follows.

That Plato understood Being in terms of the self is evident first, in the very question posed in the Republic. It is not mere coincidence that in the one dialogue where Plato's understanding of Being is expressed most clearly, that the guiding question is what is justice. Second, the fact that the act of transcendence, which is intended to disclose Being in its difference from the city, transpires through an education, in the proper sense of this term (paideia), attests to Plato's thinking of Being in terms of human beings. Third, I will indicate that which inhibits the ascent out of the city and how the limit is overcome. Both the limit and its overcoming point towards self-understanding as the locus for the disclosure of Being.

a) what is justice ?: The central question of the Republic, what is justice, concerns the self and its understanding. Socrates, while expressing dissatisfaction with his refutation of Thrasymachus says,

> The result of our discussion is that I don't know a thing. As long as I don't know what justice is, I can hardly know whether it's an excellence or not and whether its possessor will be happy or unhappy (356c).

What then is justice ? The reply comes shortly afterwards and is repeated throughout the dialogue: justice is minding one's own business and not meddling in that of others (433d). The

justice of the city consists of each citizen performing the function for which they are suited (370b-c, 434). But Socrates's definition of justice is political. Doing that for which one is fit in political life depends upon one's self-understanding. Prior to making decisions, choices and arranging a just existence, one must first have an understanding of who one is. One thus finds that from the moment Socrates refutes the conventional opinions of Cephalus and Polemarchus as to what justice is and wins at least the ears of Thrasymachus, that the entire discussion turns upon an understanding of justice, not in terms of the city but in terms of the soul. Heidegger says that the entire movement and structure of the dialogue,

> aims to show that the sustaining ground and determining essence of all political Being consists in nothing less than the "theoretical," that is, in essential knowledge of dike and dikaiosyne (N/165).

The sustaining ground of political existence is a transpolitical understanding of the justice of the soul.

b) education: Education Plato tells us is concerned with "the internal true self and its business" (443d). Heidegger explains

> "Education" (Bildung) implies two things: it means first of all forming in the sense of developing and molding a character. This "forming" however "forms" (molds) at the same time through its preconceived adaptation to a standard aspect which is therefore called the prototype. Education (Bildung) is above all molding and giving direction by means of a form (PDT/256).

Education is not concerned with the conventions of the city

such as skills that are best suited for the quarrels in a court of law, but rather with a `standard prototype.' The `standard prototype' refers to the `Being of man.' Heidegger characterizes the ascent to the sun in Book VII as an inversion and claims that "it concerns the Being of man and therefore takes place in the basis of his nature or essence ... This orienting and reorienting of human nature into the realm respectively designated for it is the essence of what Plato calls paideia" (PDT/256). It is through an education that one transcends the city. In the dialogue, education emerges as the final act through which justice can be brought into being. I return to the dialogue in order to illustrate the centrality of education for the disclosure of Being.

Socrates questions the fourth and most just city,

> What about the city we just founded ? Do any of her citizens have a knowledge, not of something in the city but of the city as a whole, that judges and deliberates how she may have the best relations with herself and other cities ? (428d).

The city cannot manifest or bring justice into being because one who not only has but possesses knowledge, not of anything in the city, but of the city as a whole, does not exist. In order for a just city to "grow into possibility and see the light of the sun" (473e) it requires a ruler. It is a comedy, and Socrates expects to be "drowned in laughter" but justice cannot be known in existence unless either philosophers become kings or kings become philosophers (473e). Heidegger explains what this could mean,

> It means that the basic modes of behaviour that sustain and define the community must be grounded in essential knowledge, assuming of course that the community, as an order of being, grounds itself on its own basis, and that it does not wish to adopt standards from any other order (N/166).

The standard that belongs to the city but is not the city itself must be sought `higher up'. Glaucon is spirited (his name means one with gleaming eyes) and responsible (474). He has a `latent' understanding of Being but has not yet brought it into existence. Socrates therefore educates Glaucon to be a philosopher-king.

c) transcendence and desire: The act of transcending toward the soul is limited by a manner of reasoning that is dispassionate. This sort of reasoning is formal, indifferent to context and often meanders into the realm of suppositions and hypothetical situations in order to substantiate itself. Its limits are exhibited by Socrates in the building of cities on analogy with the justice of the soul. As the cities are made to correspond increasingly with that which is beyond the city they become more and more abstract and dehumanized. It is the act of leaving the city that paradoxically concretizes the knowledge of what justice is. I will not recount the character of every city but merely refer to the fourth and most just city for purposes of an example.

The fourth city, that corresponds to the justice of the soul to the highest degree, is a utopia. Socrates suggests that it may not be human and that it is but a pious wish (450d). It is built according to the idea of a geometrical

model, that is, according to an idea of perfection that is human-made, universalized and indifferent to the object of knowledge to which it is applied. Socrates expresses reservations about the possibility of demonstrating it (472d) and then concludes, "It isn't impossible, nor are we discussing impossibilities, through we ourselves admit that it's difficult" (499d). It is in the end difficult but nevertheless possible to create a city as perfect as a geometric model. But if so, the needs of the body, its desires and those things that are held private, must be eradicated. The eradication of desire is acheived by making it public and hence the utopian nature of the fourth city. Socrates says to Glaucon during the building of the fourth city, where desire is excluded to the highest degree, "any disorderly conduct, sexual or otherwise, is impious in a happy city and must be forbidden" (458e).

The fourth city cannot realize justice because it excludes the desire for the justice of the soul. Although as Socrates says, speech is more perfect than deed, justice does not have its ground in human ideas or models of perfection. Contemplating the angles of a triangle does not make one just except in the imagination. In order to bring justice into existence and know it, there must be a desire and passion for it. The desire for justice is expressed in what one does. Adeimantus therefore, recognizing the `theoretical' character of Socrates's presentation of what justice is and as early as

Book II, in regard to what justice does to the soul, says,

> And don't give us some merely theoretical proof of the superiority of justice over injustice. Show what each in itself does to its possessor to make justice good and injustice evil (367b).

Adeimantus insists, "And remember: no theoretical proofs" (367e). The concern for the practice of justice resurfaces when in Book V Adeimantus wants to know in what way wives and children are held in common (499) and asks of Socrates that he, "try to persuade us that this regime is possible and show us how, and let the rest go" (472). Socrates ultimately shows what justice is through the education of a philosopher in deed. It is not through the eradication or supression of desire, but through its release and reorientation toward the soul that justice is brought into existence. This may be read back into Gluacon's formation: he yearns and desires to possess something he has `in essence' or possibility. He senses the urgency of the words `become who you are.' Socrates refers to this desire as divine madness.

c) Conclusion: Plato and Heidegger stand on common ground. I have shown this with respect to the question of Being, concreteness, method and justice. For these reasons it could be argued that Heidegger, rather than critically overcoming Plato, is critically overcoming Platonism and retreiving the thought of Plato. Perhaps the most pointed indication of this, without having to develop the relation of human beings to Being in Heidegger's philosophy, are in the following fragments.

> In the poetic relation between dike and techne, dike stands for the Being of beings as a whole. ... The oldest saying that has come down to us, that of Anaximander, speaks of beings in an essential connection with dike ... Similarly Heraclitos speaks of dike in making an essential statement about being ... Finally, Parmenides himself is a crucial witness to the philosophical use of the word dike in speaking of Being (IM/166).

Heidegger concludes, "Being as dike is the key to the essent in its structure." The Republic is about the justice of the city and yet the just constitution of the city depends upon the `polis' of the soul. The question of Being is a way in which to dislcose the justice of the soul in its difference from the city so that the order of the soul and that of the city might correspond. Without a proper understanding of how to disclose Being in its difference from human making, Being cannot be brought into existence in `truth'.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Act of Transcendence According to Heidegger

In this chapter I am interested in explaining how Heidegger differentiates Being from beings when Being is thought of in terms of time. This requires that I resume the `destruction' of Platonism that was begun in chapter II not however with a view to its nihilistic implications but rather with a view to the hidden possibility that resides in any forgetting of Being. In the first part of this chapter I take the first step over Platonism and find that an understanding of Being belongs to human beings. In order to show that human beings do not create Being I explain, in the second part, how Heidegger can differentiate Being from beings in terms of time. After I have clarified Heidegger's understanding of the difference between Being and beings with respect to time I conclude the chapter by examining more closely the transformed understanding of Being (in terms of seeing and hearing) and the art making (language) that enables a disclosure of Being in its difference from beings.

Part I: The `Destruction' of Platonism

i) The Step Back

In chapter II, I explained how, according to Heidegger, Being is reduced to the will of the subject and that Platonism is nihilism. And yet, an entrance into the essence of nihilism is itself the condition of its overcoming.

> The entry into its essence is the first step by which we leave nihilism behind us. The path of this

> entry has the direction and manner of a going back. It does not, to be sure, mean a going backward to times lived through in the past in order to refresh them tentatively in an artificial form. The "back" here designates the direction towards that locality (the oblivion of Being), from out of which metaphysics obtained and retains its origin[22].

An entrance into the essence of nihilism is a return not to a past that is long ago but to the origins of metaphysics as they presist today. Despite the fact that in Heidegger's view we are at the most extreme point of having forgotten Being, an understanding of Being is near.

> Productive comportment is not limited just to the producible and produced but harbours within itself a remarkable breadth of possibility for understanding the Being of beings,...(BPP/116).

Viewed in this way nihilism is not a completely negative mode of being but rather harbours within itself the possibility of an understanding of Being - it preserves and shelters Being.

> In such concealing there is based, however, the essence of oblivion known to the Greeks. It is at the end, that is, from the beginning of its essence nothing negative, but as a concealment presumably a sheltering which still preserves what has not yet been revealed[23].

In the very concealment of Being there is hope that Being will be understood in its difference from beings. The first step towards a disclosure of Being in its difference from beings is a step back to the condition of treating beings like tools.

Reducing Being to the will of the subject points to the

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[22] M. Heidegger, The Question of Being. Trans. W. Kluback et. al., (New Haven: College and U. Press, 1958), 103.

[23] M. Heidegger, The Question of Being, 89.

fact that it is not an eternal idea, independent of the subject, that is responsible for how beings come to be but rather, our very manner of existing. Heidegger denies that the distance between the matter and the proposition is bridged by a series of causes and continues,

> We are rather always already comporting ourselves towards the beings around us. Statements do not first bring about this relation, but rather the converse is true. Statements are first possible on the basis of an always latent comportment to beings, Dasein, the "I" that makes statements, is always already "among" beings about which it makes statements. A first consequence is that making statements, as a stating about something, is not at all a primordial relation to beings but is itself only possible on the basis of our already-being-among-beings, be this a perceptual or some other kind of practical comportment. We can say that making statements about X is only possible on the basis of having to do with X (MFL/126).

It is possible for statements to correspond to beings because beings have already manifested themselves as objects according to our practical comportment to them, be it "perceptual or some other kind of practical comportment". Beings are made present, they stand opposed and before us as objects, and are thus capable of being said according to our way of existing, disposition and behaviour toward them. Propositional `truth' (which is correct but not true because it veils the essence of truth) is in other words derived from ontological truth. "The manifestation of the essent (ontic truth) depends upon the revelation of the constitution of the Being of the essent (ontological truth)"[24]. In the step back from localizing

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[24] M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 17-18.

transcendence in cognition to existence the understanding of the self as a subject is transformed. Heidegger calls the transformed notion of the self Dasein.

Dasein is unlike any other being. Beings other than Dasein are defined in terms of a `what'.

> because we cannot define Dasein's essence by citing a "what" of the kind that pertains to a subject-matter [eines sachhaltigen Was], and because its essence lies rather in the fact that in each case it has its Being to be, and has it as its own, we have choosen to designate this entity as "Dasein", a term which is purely an expression of its Being [als reiner Seinsausdruck] (SZ/12, BT/32-33).

Dasein is distinct in that it is the only being that exists. "The reason why we reserve the concept `existence' for the Dasein's mode of being lies in the fact that being-in-the-world belongs to this its being" (BPP/170). To no other being than Dasein does there belong an understanding of Being. Because Dasein always understands beings in some way and thus is responsible for how beings come to be, Heidegger says that Dasein is transcendent. Dasein's existence is transcendent. And yet, as the first move that so to speak overcomes Platonism, has not Heidegger reduced Being to the will of human beings ?

To claim, as Heidegger does, that Being belongs to an entity called Dasein seems patently absurd. And yet Heidegger admits, "Man and Being are appropriated to each other. They belong to each other" (ID/31-32). Being or the `world' belongs to Dasein. "Since the world is not a being but belongs to Dasein, we obviously cannot understand it as a relationship

between Dasein as one kind of being and world as another (ER/87)." Because Being belongs to Dasein Heidegger's step back from the self as a subject to Dasein seems remarkably egoistic. Heidegger does not seem to have a conception of the self that is any different from that of the Platonist when he writes, " Of course only as long as Dasein is (that is, only as long as an understanding of Being is ontically possible), `is there' Being." (SZ/212, BT/255). Heidegger's philosophy seems to be a version of solipsism. Dasein does not surpass toward an object - "objectified beings are not that toward which surpassing happens" (ER/39). Heidegger makes this clear,

> It is commonly taught in philosophy that what is transcendent is things, objects. But what is originally transcendent, what does the transcending, is not things as over against Dasein... (BPP/162).

Dasein does not surpass a "`boundary' which stretches out before the subject and forces it to `remain in' (immanence) nor a `gap' which separates it from the object" (ER/38-39). Rather, because Being belongs to Dasein, the pathway to an understanding of Being is made by Dasein itself. Dasein surpasses itself to itself.

Heidegger nevertheless claims that there is a difference between the egoistic `I', the extant being and its understanding of Being.

ii) <u>Being Determines Dasein</u>

When one claims that Being belongs to Dasein and that Dasein surpasses itself to itself, one is inclined to conclude

that Heidegger subordinates Being to the will of human beings and that there is therefore nothing `beyond' human beings or whatever happens to be happening in history with which to measure either truth or ethical conduct. Neither of these conclusions recognize the "metaphysical-ontological" status of Heidegger's claims.

Heidegger writes,

> The introductory definition, "Being is the transcendens pure and simple," articulates in one simple sentence the way the essence of Being hitherto has illumined man. ... Being is illumined for man in the ecstatic projection [Entwurf]. But this projection does not create Being (ET/217).

Being illumines and is not created by human beings. Being `illumines' human beings in the sense that we are determined to manifest and reveal beings on the basis of our understanding-of-Being. Heidegger therefore insists that Being is prior to beings, including the being to which it belongs - the extant "I", in just this sense: that it is the ontological condition for the possibility of any concrete ontical project.

Heidegger states, "Dasein is in each case essentially mine" and explains,

> If our task is to define this characteristic of Dasein ontologically, this does not mean we should investigate the essence of my self, as this factical individual, or of some other given individual. The object of inquiry is not the individual essence of my self, but it is the essence of mineness and selfhood as such. Likewise, if "I" is the object of the ontological interpretation, then this is not the individual I-ness, of my self, but I-ness in its metaphysical neutrality; we call this neutral I-ness "egoicity" (MFL/188).

Where one seeks to define the ontological character of Dasein, the object of inquiry is not the individual self but the essence of `mineness' and `selfhood.' Similarly, where one seeks to define the `I' one investigates `egoicity' or `I-ness.' Heidegger distinguishes between the factical or concrete individual and the metaphysical essence of the individual pointing out that the latter is neutral, without gender, and prior to the partitioning and division in existence that is appropriate to the individual. Heidegger defines metaphysical neutrality, "Neutrality is not the voidness of an abstraction, but precisely the potency of the origin, which bears in itself the intrinsic possibility of every concrete factual humanity" (MFL/137). Dasein's metaphysical and neutral essence is a potentiality-for- Being. It determines Dasein in that it is, as Heidegger says, `that for the sake of which' Dasein exists.

`That for the sake of which' Dasein exists is not a `thing'. Dasein does not understand itself in terms of things but in terms of `who'. The `who' of Dasein is its world or essence. It is prior to the `I', disregards whether or not the `I' exists, because it is the condition of having an `I.'

> Dasein is therefore not a being-in-the-world because it in fact exists, but conversely. It can only exist in fact as Dasein because its essence is being-in-the-world (MFL/169).

The essence of Dasein precedes, is the condition of, and makes possible its existence and not the reverse. Being is prior to beings in the sense of an essence that is the condition of

having a self but is not the self itself. It is then toward itself that Dasein leaps in order to be determined to bring beings to be in and for themselves. In existing for itself Dasein is open to the grounds that make it possible for beings to be what and how they are. When the ground of beings, that belongs to Dasein, is disclosed, Dasein can knows whether or not beings come to be in and for themselves. Beings come to be for themselves when Dasein chooses itself (an understanding-of-Being), they withdraw and distort themselves when Dasein turns away from and denies itself. Heidegger therefore makes it clear,

> We said that Dasein chooses itself. One inadvertently then fills in the term Dasein with the usual concept of the isolated, egoistic subject and then interprets Dasein's choosing itself as a solipsistic-egoistic contraction into oneself. In the genuine metaphysical sense precisely the reverse is the case (MFL/190).

Far from having a conception of the self that subordinates beings to the will of human beings, Heidegger claims to have reversed the conception of the self as a solipsistic-ego. The essence that determines Dasein belongs to Dasein, but it is different from the individual. Dasein so to speak has Being but does not possess Being. The difference between the individual factical self (the subject) and its understanding-of-Being is the ontological difference. "We thus term this distinction that first enables something like an understanding-of-Being the ontological difference" (MFL/153). In order to disclose an understanding-of-Being Dasein

transcends the pre-philosophical or Plato-hobbyist mode of being toward its understanding-of-Being.

Part II: Being and Time

The relation of Being and time needs to be clarified first with respect to the eternal Being of Platonism, where `eternity' is a mode of time and second with respect to Dasein.

i) Being and time in Platonism

Platonism holds that Being is eternal and to be understood in juxtaposition to time. Anything that is not represented to consciousness as an eternal and unchanging idea, is not `real'. Beings `in time' change and flow one into the other. Time is but a series of `nows'; a `no-longer-now', a `not-yet-now' but in any case always a `now.' "Time becomes the intrinsically free-floating runoff of a sequence of nows" (BPP/272). The present is undifferentiated from either the past or the future. Being is not time and thus time means nothing in itself. It is only by ascending to the `eternal idea' that the `real' is available to the subject.

Heidegger objects,

> That there are `eternal truths' will not be adequately proved until someone has succeeded in demonstrating that Dasein has been and will be for all eternity (SZ/227, BT/270).

Heidegger is aware that the motive for `idealizing' the subject was the requirement that in contrast to the empirical, philosophy should have the a priori as its theme. Heidegger however asks, "Yet is this requirement satisfied by positing

an `ideal subject' ? Is not such a subject a fanciful idealization ? With such a conception have we not missed precisely the a priori character of that merely `factual' subject, Dasein ?" (SZ/229, BT/272). Plato, as I mentioned in chaper III, advanced beyond the early Greek temporal notion of Being by thinking of Being in terms of the self, but in so doing, he overlooked temporality. He thought of Being in terms of time, as the eternal, and immortalized the subject to whom Being belongs. Heidegger thus criticizes the tradition of philosophy for its ontological interpretation of Dasein,

> ... it emerges that the philosophical tradition interpreted this being, metaphysically, in a way that is not primordial and appropriate and not at all in the context of the basic problem. And this the tradition did, not out of negligence and incompetence, but for grounds that rest in the nature of the genesis of the understanding-of-Being itself (MFL/149).

Being disclosed itself to Plato as an eternal idea. His ontology, that immortalized the subject, was a definite response to the sending of Being. And yet, it is neither primordial nor appropriate in the context of the basic problem of connecting Being and time. The being to whom Being belongs is finite.

ii) <u>Being - Time - Dasein</u>

a) Temporality:

> We talked about beings as a priori. If a-prioricity is a basic characteristic of Being, and if a-prioricity is a time designation, and if Being is connected with time in such a way that the understanding-of-Being is rooted in the temporality of Dasein, then there is an intrinsic connection between the a priori and temporality, the Being-

> constitution of Dasein, the subjectivity of the subject (MFL/149-150).

Being is connected with time "in such a way that the understanding of Being is rooted in the temporality of Dasein". If Being belongs to Dasein and temporality is essential to Dasein, Being must by understood by way of Dasein's temporality. Temporality is the condition for any understanding of Being.

> "Temporality" is intended to indicate that temporality, in the existential analytic, represents the horizon from which we understand Being (BPP/228).

"The ontological condition of the possibility of the understanding of Being is temporality itself" (ibid). If Being is to be understood through the temporality of Dasein, one's understanding of the usual notion of time changes.

Just because Being belongs to Dasein does not mean that Being is to be understood `in time'. Being is instead to be understood with reference to time. But the notion of time with reference to which Being is to be understood is not that of regular clock time. Heidegger writes,

> To repeat: expectancy, retention and making-present are not merely the way we grasp the then, the formerly, and the now, not merely modes of being conscious of them; they are rather the very origin of the then, the formerly, and the now. Expectancy is not a mode of being conscious of time but, in a primordial and genuine sense is time itself (MFL/203).

Time Heidegger claims originates in the existential structures of Dasein. It originates in them in the sense that the `free run-off of nows', where the past, present and the future are

undifferentiated and mean nothing, are grounded and differentiated in Dasein's act of projecting itself toward its essence. Time that has been grounded corresponds, in its three modes, to the existential structures retention, expectancy and making-present.

> We shall point to temporality as the meaning of the Being of that entity which we call "Dasein". If this is to be demonstrated, those structures of Dasein which we shall provisionally exhibit must be Interpreted over again as modes of temporality (SZ/17, BT/38).

I will analyze two of the existential structures of Dasein, retention and expectancy, and corroborate them with their respective time designations. When this is done, I will be in a position to explain how Being is disclosed in its difference from beings as the present.

b) Dasein's Existential Structures: Retention refers to the mode of being of the Plato-hobbyist. I explained in chapter II that by thinking of Being as an idea, beings come to be for human interests. Being are rendered use-items. Thinking of Being as an idea is therefore said by Heidegger to be an average or pre-philosophical understanding-of-Being (BPP/281). The Platonist thinks of beings in terms of an in order to, a for which. Beings are ordered according to other beings of the same kind in a network of reference relations called a context of equipmentality. Heidegger does not deny that Dasein always finds itself in such a context. Dasein is `thrown' and so already-by-beings or situated in the `they', <u>das Man</u>, or everyone, and can only acknowledge that it is and

has to be.

> That which surpasses and so "passes beyond" beings must first be situated in the midst of beings. As situated, Dasein is preoccupied with beings in the sense that it forms part of beings; and it forms part of beings in the sense that it is disposed and permeated by beings (ER/107-109).

Retention is not something that stands apart from Dasein and that happened long ago. It is not something that is over when it is past or when it is forgotten.

> Even if in some way by some manipulations, I may be able to keep my bygoneness far from myself, nevertheless, forgetting, repressing, suppressing are modes in which I myself am my own having-been-ness (BPP/265-266).

What Dasein already-has-been is what Dasein is regardless of whether it remembers or forgets. Retention refers to the way in which Being has revealed itself to Dasein and although Dasein may not have choosen it, it forms an integral component of who Dasein is. "In every sense and in every case everything we have been is an essential determination of our existence" (BPP/265).

Expectancy is Dasein's capability-to-be or its understanding-of-Being. In expecting a possibility Dasein comes toward itself. It reaches out to its own potentiality-to-be and this potentiality comes toward it.

> This coming-toward-oneself from one's most peculiar possibility, a coming toward which is implicit in the Dasein's existence and of which all expecting is a specific mode, is the primary concept of the future (BPP/265).

The future is a possibility although not a logical possibility in the sense of what is not yet but could be but an

existential possibility in the sense of who one is in essence and could be. It is, as mentioned, an ontological possibility that makes ontic projects possible.

iii) The Act of Transcendence

To repeat "expectancy is not a mode of being conscious of time but, in a primordial and genuine sense is time itself" (MFL/203). Expectancy is time in the sense that, in leaping from its pre-philosophical mode of being toward its understanding-of-Being, Dasein grounds the pre-philosophical mode as the past and its understanding-of-Being as the present. The grounding of Being as the present happens in the act of differentiating it from the past. The present then, in order to disclose Being in its difference from beings, is the unity of the past and the future. That is to say, it is only by bringing its past toward itself in a leap forward that the past can be differentiated from the future. Heidegger writes of Dasein's preoccupation with beings (retention-the past),

> This "second" type of grounding does not arise after the "first" but is "simultaneous" with it. This does not mean that they are present at hand at the same moment but that the project of world and preoccupation with being, as ways of grounding, belong to one temporality which they jointly institute (ER/109).

Were retention or Dasein's "pre-occupation with being" not together with an understanding-of-Being (expectancy-the future), an understanding-of-Being would itself be inconceivable. Dasein would have no need to overcome itself were it not for the limits of the actual. On the other hand,

Dasein would be unable to overcome retention had it not the capacity to get underneath and master it through understanding. There is no expectancy without retention and no retention without expectancy (they are equiprimordial). Dasein therefore throws itself forward toward its future by bringing its past toward itself. The mode of time in which they are united in difference is the present. Dasein discloses its understanding of Being in its difference from beings as the present and is determined by this understanding of Being to manifest beings.

> Because the passage across exists with Dasein, and because with it beings which are not Dasein get surpassed, such beings become manifest as such, i.e., in themselves. Nothing else but transcendence, which has in advance surpassed beings, first makes it possible for these, previously surpassed beings, to be ontically opposite [Dasein] and as opposite to be apprehended in themselves (MFL/166).

By transcending the past toward the future, beings come to be not for a subject but rather for themselves. It is thus through an involvement with its understanding-of-Being, that Dasein is determined to let beings come to be in and for themselves.

> However, the phrase required now - to let beings be - does not refer to neglect and indifference but rather the opposite. To le be is to engage oneself with beings. ... To let be - that is, to let beings be as the beings which they are - means to engage oneself with the open region and its openness into which every being comes to stand, bringing that openness, as it were, along with itself (ET/127).

Dasein does not create Being, but rather lets beings come to be in and of their own accord in a comportment to beings that

is open.

In conclusion, Heidegger argues that Being belongs to Dasein but is not subordinated to the will of human beings. It is not subordinated to the will but rather is that for the sake of which Dasein exists. Being determines Dasein when Dasein thinks of the difference between Being and beings not as a third entity, "an invention that is no less doubtful than medieval speculation about angels" (BPP/214-215), but as difference. This difference, equivalent to Dasein's temporality, is the meaning of Being, the condition for the disclosure of Being as Being. It is through temporality and the grounding of Being not `in time' but as Time that Being is disclosed in its difference from beings. Being is disclosed as the present, a unity in difference, standing-in-itself.

Part III: The Open Comportment to Beings

Heidegger challenges the tradition on its understanding of Being. Being is concealed when it is thought of solely in terms of perception. Heidegger transforms the perceptual relation to beings and opens the door to objectivity with a notion of the self that is in-the-world. Heidegger writes of the Greek sense of objectivity (the over-against),

> In the over-against, the "against" reveals itself in what comes over the perceiving, viewing-hearing human, over those who have never conceived of themselves as a subject for an Object. Accordingly, whatever is present is not what a subject throws forth as an Object; rather, it is what accrues to perceiving and what human viewing and hearing hold up and portray as what has come over it (PR/82).

Objectivity does not lie in the assertion of the self over

beings where beings are determined as objects before the fact by ideas, but rather, Dasein acheives an objectivity from within the world by holding up what has come over it. Beings are not represented by the subject but rather, the revealing of beings in and for themselves is an exposure to beings that "comes over the perceiving, viewing-hearing human". Dasein does not assert its will over beings, but rather, in order for them to come to be in and of their own accord, Dasein's freedom is possessed by Being. The pathway towards objectivity is with a thinking whose ears, through silence, are claimed by Being. Heidegger discards the view that "the most presuppositionless approach is the one beginning with a worldless subject" (MFL/187-188) and in its place, finds a presuppositionless approach to beings in being-in-the-world or Dasein.

I explain in this section how, in contrast to the exclusively perceptual relation to beings, hearing is the appropriate comportment for an understanding of Being as Being and that speech that follows what is heard is not productive but unveils and reveals beings in Being. Such speech is true. I begin with a broad outline of the traditional understanding of the senses and how it is transformed through the ontological difference.

i) Transformation of the senses

In the Republic Glaucon makes fun of those that "run around to every festival in city and town, listening to the

choruses as though their ears had been hired" (475d). They are hobbyists - lovers of opinion coasting the surface of ontic truth. Heidegger shares a similar assessment of this sort of hearing with the reader,

> Mere hearing scatters and diffuses itself in what is commonly believed and said, in hearsay, in doxa, appearance. True hearing has nothing to do with the ear and mouth,....Those who merely hear by listening around and assembling rumours are and remain the axynetoi, the uncomprehending (IM/129-130).

Hearing that is determined by mere sounds and rumours is as out of order as is seeing that determines what is seen, in the sense that, it presupposes Being can be reduced to empirical properties.

> Sometimes we see and clearly have before our eyes a state of affairs. Nevertheless, we do not bring into view what is most obvious in what lies present before us. Seeing something and expressly bringing into view what is seen are not the same thing (PR/46).

It would seem that nothing could be more simple than simply looking at a form and verifying that it `is' for instance, `rabbit.' And yet, Heidegger suggests in the passage above that this is not obvious. In the understanding of the senses to which Heidegger is referring, `rabbit' is not brought into view, instead, one sees `a four-legged thing that jumps.' In this understanding of the senses we see and hear `with' them but not `through' them.

When one merely hears and sees `with' the senses, a fuge is sound waves hitting the typanum of the ear (PR/47) and the figure of Apollo is but photons of light. The fuge itself and

Apollo itself are reduced to their empirical properties. Attempting to know Being or the `whole' of a being through this understanding of the senses, that reduces even what is heard to a visible pattern, is futile. When Being or the statue itself is defined in terms of what is seen, an extended body, one cannot keep both the whole and the part in view at the same time. Either the whole is reduced to the part or one divides and analyzes the part in an effort to know the whole. Speech that follows what is seen stutters, it lacks coherency and breaks. Doubtless one can impress upon one's memory a great number of details and facts, but without a thread or weaving of the facts through a thought there is an inherent deficiency of comprehension that is usually compensated for by either a dependency upon the written word or the parroting of loosely related platitudes. What is required is that thinking be liberated from the perceptual relation to beings in a `jump.'

`Liberating' thinking from this understanding of the senses does not mean for Heidegger a flight into idealism. Both materialism and idealism are for Heidegger flip sides of the same coin insofar as they both relate to beings exclusively as objects - in one case as sensible and in the other as supersensible objects. The so to speak `liberation' of thinking entails that thought be differentiated from the idea but this does not mean that seeing or that which is visible, the object, are abandoned in the disclosure of Being.

Heidegger transforms the traditional relation of thinking to the senses, i.e., where thought is shackled to either a mental or sensible idea, through an encounter with nothing. It is through the ontological difference that the practical relation of human beings to beings is transformed such that hearing takes precedence to seeing in the disclosure of Being. I introduce how a transformed notion of the senses discloses Being by pointing to what is meant by nothing.

First, I note that nothingness is not absolute or everything. The act of transcendence is a unitary phenomenon and thus, nothing is an essential structural element of Being. Being would be inconceivable in its difference from beings without nothing. Second, nothingness is not ontical, that is to say, it does not refer to there not being a piece of cake on the table as opposed to there being a piece of cake on the table. What then is nothing ?

In the `destruction' of Platonism I explained that it is we, through speech and deed, who give beings the opportunity to enter the world. It is thus our relation or attitude to beings that is transformed and not beings themselves. Heidegger in Being and Time makes this clear in a study of anxiety (SZ/228-235). The rather vague concept of nothingness is concretized when at the most extreme point of forgetting, one realizes that Being is forgotten. The meaning that had organized one's existence is then lost. Surrounding oneself with beings or destroying them does not free one from the

uncanniness (homelessness) of anxiety. In the grip of anxiety Dasein is metaphysically powerless. Its powerlessness "cannot be removed by reference to the conquest of nature, to technology, which rages about in the world today like an unshackled beast" (MFL/215). The powerlessness is not a psychological state but ontological and thus involves the ontological structure of Dasein, its moods, understanding and speech. The leap through nothing is a suspension of the speech that had treated beings like tools. In the leap one's pre-conceptions and pre-judgements show themselves to be a wall of self-deception and conceit and so Dasein is speechless.

The transformation of the traditional understanding of the senses and thinking takes place by transforming one's relation to beings. Being is not disclosed through the lens of a microscope or through the window of a space ship. The commanding role of the subject, through a comportment toward nothingness is undermined. Thinking is not encased in ideas that determine beings to be in advance of their appearance but rather, is open to Being. In this openness to Being, Dasein is speechless but speechlessness is not dumb - it listens. Heidegger therefore claims that thinking, thinks `through' the senses. It transcends the mere empirical fact because it is attuned to what is not visible, how beings come to be.

ii) <u>Hearing, Speaking and Seeing</u>

> A statement is invested with its correctness by the openness of comportment; for only through the latter can what is opened up really become the standard for the presentative correspondence. Open

> comportment must let itself be assigned this standard. This means that it must take over a pregiven standard for all presenting. This belongs to the openness of comportment (ET/124).

The open comportment that lets itself be assigned the standard is defined by hearing. Through hearing language makes beings visible in and for themselves. In this section I analyze the open comportment first into hearing, then into the speech that follows what is heard, and finally, I explain how what is seen is fused with what is heard in the `moment of truth'.

a) Hearing: "True hearing" Heidegger says means:

> To follow the logos and what it is, namely the collectness of beings themselves. We can hear truly only if we are followers. This has nothing to do with the lobes of our ears (IM/129).

What kind of hearing follows ?

An open comportment to Being is without a light by which to analyze and divide beings. There is no average understanding of Being to enforce. Instead, in a region overwhich it has no control, Dasein waits in silent anticipation for a sound it is certain it cannot make. The silent anticipation is the receptivity of speech, a heeding, attentiveness, a listening that has the ability to be determined by what is heard. In contrast to hearing with the ear, which Heidegger says is never a sufficient condition of our hearing, again, because the fuge itself is not the same as a sound wave, Heidegger writes,

> More precisely, if we hear, something is not simply added to what the ear picks up; rather, what the

> ear perceives and how it perceives will already be attuned and determined by what we hear, be this only that we hear the titmouse and the robin and the lark (PR/47).

In an open comportment to beings, where one is attuned to silence, the song of the robin and the lark determines hearing and thus do ordinary hearing and seeing pass away for us. Hearing that has been prepared through the encounter with nothing is powerful in its ability to receive the `voice' of Being. In contrast to mere hearing, hearing that is prepared is sensitive to the temporal happening of a sound. Hearing hears, without mediation or light, as long as the sound lasts and thus does not violate the temporal happening of Being. Hearing that follows therefore, in the broadest sense, is open and listens. But open to what and what does it hear ?

In the passage quoted above Heidegger says that "true hearing ... follows the logos ... the collectedness of beings themselves" (IM/129). Presumably hearing hears a word or message. Heidegger however denies that one hears in the sense of a `communication.' During an analysis of Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-Being, Heidegger claims that what is heard is Dasein's conscience and that it says nothing or is simply silence.

> But how are we to determine what is said in the talk that belongs to this kind of discourse ? What does the conscience call to him to whom it appeals? Taken strictly, nothing. The call asserts nothing, gives no information about world-events, has nothing to tell (SZ/273, BT/318).

The call of conscience has nothing to tell and yet it is

heard. Heidegger is again suggesting the difference between the ontic and the ontological. Relative to an ontic measure, the call is nothing but as the essence of Dasein, although pre-verbal, non-discursive and inaudible to mere hearing, it is heard. Heidegger says that it is silent saying. Heidegger writes of the attunement of hearing,

> To hear what is silent requires a hearing that each of us has and no one uses correctly. This hearing [Gehor] has something to do not only with the ear, but also with a human's belonging [Zugehorigkeit] to what its essence is attuned to. Humans are attuned [ge-stimmt] to what de-termines [be-stimmt] their essence. In this de-termining, humans are touched and called forth by a voice [Stimme] that peals all the more purely it silently reverberates through what speaks (PR/50).

What is heard is not nothing, but nor is it a mystical voice. "The call comes from me and yet from beyond me and over me" (SZ/275, BT/320). The voice does and does not belong to Dasein. It is a potential that comes "from beyond me." "Nothing gets called to [zugerufen] this Self, but it has been summoned [aufgerufen] to itself - that is, to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being" (SZ/273, BT/318).

In an open comportment to beings, thinking is claimed, through hearing, by Being. Thinking transcends the empirical facts, to the meaning that makes the `facts' intelligble, and lets beings come to be in the spoken word.

b) Speech: During the critical assessment of Platonism it was shown that insofar as one does not depart from the perceptual relation to beings, beings come to be and are for human interests. In the comportment to beings that is defined

by hearing, one can see how the perceptual-subjective relation to beings has been undermined. The process of emergence, how beings come to be, the act of appearing, cannot be seen. With the transformation of the comportment to beings from seeing to hearing, Dasein is open to how Being comes to be and thus, there follows a similar transformation in making. In this section I explain how making reveals beings in Being. It is not productive but rather revelatory and has its origins in the early Greek notion of poeisis.

1) Poeisis: Heidegger qoutes Plato telling us what poeisis is in the Symposium (205b), "Every occassioning for whatever passes over and goes forward into presencing from what is not presencing is poiesis, is bringing-forth (Her-vor-bringen)" (QCT/10). Heidegger says that poeisis is "what is brought forward in a process of bringing-forth, what is produced in production, and the producing itself" (N/164-165). That which is brought forth and the producing itself does not refer solely to art works. Heidegger explains that "Knowledge is the ability to put into work the Being of any particular being".

> The work of art is a work not primarily because it is wrought <gewirkt>, made, but because it brings about <er-wirkt> Being in a being; it brings about the phenomenon in which the emerging power, physis, comes to shine <sheinen> (IM/159).

Through the work of art, beings come to stand on their own. They shine in and out of their own element. Heidegger explains how poeisis and physis belong together,

> Physis is indeed poeisis in the highest sense. For what presences by means of physis has the bursting-

> open belonging to bringing-forth, e.g. the bursting of a blossom into bloom, in itself (en heautoi). In contrast what is brought forth by the artisan or the artist, e.g. the silver chalice, has the bursting belonging to bringing-forth not in itself, but in another (in alloi) in the craftsman or artist (QCT/10).

Heidegger uses the example of poeisis bringing-forth in the manner in which a flower brings itself forth in a blossom in order to emphasize the play of poeisis and physis. Their affinity resides in the `how' and not the `what.'

A stream Heidegger says means what flows but "`stream' means also the `how' of the beings of beings (MFL/172). Being is the how and not the what. A stream's mode of being is flowing and not rolling. To know what a stream or flower is, one must therefore be attentive to how it is and this is a question that challenges Dasein's average way of existing. It is not without a transformation of the pre-philosophical understanding-of-Being that beings can come to be in and for themselves. That is to say the "how" of beings, their manner of coming to be, is beyond the perceptual comportment to beings that modifies them according to a human perspective. When one speaks according to how beings come to be, they are revealed by poeisis in themselves.

> The primary character of assertion is apophansis, a determination that Aristotle, and in principle Plato, too, already saw. Translated literally, it means the exhibiting of something from its own self, apo, letting it be seen as it is in itself, phainesthai (BPP/209).

Assertion in the sense of apophansis lets beings be seen as they are in themselves. I will now move forward into the terms

Heidegger uses for representing the event of bringing beings to stand. He advances beyond the early Greek notion of poeisis through the ontologization of truth. In other words, the relation of human beings to beings in the event of making Being present is made explicit. The `how' that unites poeisis and physis is an open comportment to beings.

2) The Language of Being: In the "Letter on Humanism" Heidegger writes, "thinking lets itself be claimed by Being so that it can say the truth of Being" (LH/194). In order for beings to take their stand and be said, or exhibited such as they are, Dasein must be involved in Being, taken over and possessed by Being. In the possession of Being or through a radical involvement with it, Dasein "lets beings be".

> To engage oneself with the disclosedness of beings is not to lose oneself in them; rather, such engagement withdraws in the face of beings in order that they might reveal themselves with respect to what and how they are and in order that presentative correspondence might take its standard from them (ET/128).

By maintaining itself in an open comportment Dasein does not so to speak lay `wind eggs' - it does speak as if there were no ears to hear it. Under the restraining power of Being Dasein reveals beings in their coming to be. Heidegger explains what is necessary if how and what beings are, are to come to stand on their own or under their own power.

> This can occur only if beings present themselves along with the presentative statement so that the latter subordinates itself to the directive that it speak of beings such-as they are. In following such a directive the statement conforms to beings. Speech that directs itself accordingly is correct

> (true). What is thus said is the correct (the true) (ET/124).

Speech subordinates itself to a directive that belongs to beings and by following it, brings beings into existence of their own accord, for and in themselves. The presentative statement conforms to Being and speaks of beings in Being. Speech that lets beings be as they are in themselves is correct (the true). Beings that are brought-forth in Being shine in unconcealment (aletheia).

c) Hearing-Speaking-Seeing: Heidegger illustrates the fusion of hearing, speaking and seeing with an excerpt from a letter written by Mozart.

The giving of the gift of Being is described by Mozart in terms of how his art proceeds,

> I look over it with a glance in my mind as if it were a beautiful picture or a handsome man, and hear it in the imagination not at all serially, as it must subsequently come about, but as though all at once. That is a treat. Everything - the finding and making now proceed in me in a beautiful, vivid dream. But the listening to everything all at once is indeed the best (PR/67).

In an act of inspiration, what can be heard can at the same time be brought into view: "what can be heard can at the same time be brought into view, if thinking views with an ear and hears with an eye" (PR/48). The spoken word, because it combines that which is particular to painting, in that it makes beings visible, and what is peculiar to music, that it is an unmediated response to the sending of Being, is the medium for the revealing of beings in Being.

CHAPTER FIVE

Heidegger's Critics Revisited

There are three criticisms of Heidgger that I respond to in this chapter. The first pertains to truth and art, the second to ethics and justice, and the third to being-on-the-way. In the course of responding to the criticisms that fall into these categories other critical possibilities will emerge to which a reply is in order. A degree of repetition is unavoidable.

i) Truth and Language:

Heidegger is accused by Rosen of being unable to distinguish truth from the work of art. Heidegger seems to attest to Rosen's criticism when he writes, "In connection with the question of the essence of language, the question of its origin has arisen time and time again" and continues,

> The origin of language is in essence mysterious. And this means that language can only have arisen from the overpowering, the strange and terrible, through man's departure into Being. In this departure language was Being, embodied in the word: poetry (IM/171).

The origin of language is mysterious. Originating through a departure into Being, it is poetry. Poetry is not however subject to the `irrational' whims of the will and it is Being in a sense that is not at first obvious. I clarify these points in turn.

1) The transformation of the human relation to beings that happens in a proper understanding of transcendence is suggested by Heidegger when says that the origins of language

are mysterious. In a proper understanding of transcendence, the gift of Being cannot be accounted for psychologically, physically or according to any of our sciences. Speaking of the bidding [Geheis] or hearing of Being Heidegger's notes read,

> We can never scientifically demonstrate or hope to demonstrate what this bidding says. We either hear it or don't hear it. We can prepare for this hearing or neglect this preparation (PR/69).

The hearing of Being does not create Being. The hearing of Being is an experience that overwhelms and transforms human beings. It is an experience one undergoes and it not of one's own making. Dasein stands-out to Being in order to be claimed by it. But the claiming, inherent to the relation of Dasein to Being, itself is not something that is made or created by human beings. "Thinking brings this relation to man as something handed over to it from Being" (LH/193). "Being is illuminated for man in the exstatic projection [Entwurf]. But this projection does not create Being" (LH/217). "It is only as the ones so claimed [by the principle of reason] that we are capable of assuming, that is, of receiving what proffers itself to us" (PR/85).

2) Poetry and Being. Being is bifurcated between the ontic and the ontological and this bifurcation corresponds to the seeing and hearing that are unified in the work of art. Like Being and beings, although unified, seeing and hearing are different.

While explaining how the "est" (being) and "ratio",

reason, ground or Being, belong together, Heidegger says of the intonation in the statement "nothing is without reason".

> Our thinking should now bring into view what has really already been heard in the intonation. Thinking should bring into view something one can hear. In so doing it brings into view what was unheard (of) [Un-erhort] before. Thinking is a listening [Erhoren] that brings something to view. Therefore, in thinking both ordinary hearing and seeing pass away for us, for thinking brings about in us a listening and a bringing-into-view (PR/46-47).

Thinking is a hearing and a bringing-into-view and yet, "thinking should bring into view something one can hear". What is seen is identical to but is not the same as what is heard.

In chapter III, I clarified Heidegger's interpretative relationship to philosophy. He brings into view what is unsaid. It is only through an attunement to what is heard that one can understand what `makes a true thing true.' But what is heard is not what is spoken or made visible. There is something left unsaid in what Heidegger says. Thus, while the language of Being could be spoken much of the time, it is only audible to those who have ears to hear not what is said but what is left unsaid. It is only by attuning oneself to the latter that one can distinguish a true likeness of Being from a false image. This means that, at the level of what is visible, ontical and ontological manifesting are indistinguishable. Poetry is a way of revealing Being wherein what is left unsaid is the basis for distinguishing truth from falsity.

ii) Ethics

I consider the question of the grounds for choosing justice, whether or not Heidegger has a philosophical position and then, the basis for critical evaluation in Heidegger's philosophy.

1) In the examination of the manner of reasoning characteristic of the interlocutors of Book I of the Republic, I explained how one mistakes what justice is for one's reasons for being just. It happens when one fails to transcend the gangsterisms of social life and differentiate the essence or Being of a being from the idea one has of it. The ground or reason of beings is then the same as one's idea. This is the origin of fundamentalism or dogmatism. It is self-augmenting. The Platonist has a conception of the self that defers responsibility for the coming to be of beings to something or someone other than themselves. To the question Heidegger poses as an Introduction to Metaphysics, "why is there something rather than nothing ?", the Platonist replies, "because God made it so", "because that's just the way it is" or discounts the question as meaningless but rarely replies, "because I willed it thus".

The step back from cognition to existence exposes one's way of being as the ground for the possibility of ontic truth. But `ontology' is an empty concept unless one realizes that with the step from cognition to existence comes responsibility (aitia, ground, cause). Dasein's way of existing is

responsible for beings either showing themselves as they are in themselves or for something else. Dasein is the ground of beings. "Being-true as Being-uncovering, is a way of Being for Dasein" (SZ/220, BT/263). With the step from a self-understanding as subject to Dasein, Heidegger is able to reply to the concerns of Adeimantus and Glaucon.

Although habituated to being just, neither Adeimantus nor Glaucon can, in light of the `real world', understand why one ought to be just rather than unjust. With a sense of urgency Adeimantus and Glaucon demand that Socrates explain to them why justice is choiceworthy for its own sake and how it is a good for the soul. Glaucon demands,

> I want to hear what justice and injustice each are and what power each of them has by itself when in the soul. Leave profits and consequences out of it (R/358b).

And Adeimantus re-iterates,

> Since you said justice is one of those great goods worth possessing for their consequences but still more for themselves - like seeing, hearing, thinking, and health, which produce their effects not by appearance but by their own nature - then treat it that way: as something good in itself, which helps its possessor as injustice harms (R/367d).

To answer the question what is justice in Heidegger's terms I must follow what may at first seem to be a digression. I will first contrast Dasein's way of `Being-in' with the definition of beings. This will serve to highlight how it is that Being is an issue for Dasein.

Beings are defined according to a definite location in

space, they are somewhere, and in terms of relations with other beings of the same kind. A desk is in a classroom, a classroom is in a building and so on. Entities are defined in terms of something outside of themselves - other entities of the same kind (SZ/54, BT/79). We define people this way and in so doing treat them as if they were tools not quite realizing that in so doing we are making `tools' of ourselves. This sort of turn around is possible because Dasein, unlike things, has an understanding-of-Being that determines how both beings other than Dasein and Dasein's own existence comes to be.

Heidegger writes, "In contrast to truth about extant things, truth about what exists is truth for that which exists" (MFL/185-186). Dasein's truth does not consist in defining itself in terms of the whatness of things, but rather in terms of `that for the sake of which.' `That for the sake of which' is `something' one has but does not possess. Dasein organizes its life, orders and arranges beings according to its understanding-of-Being. But `that for the sake of which' Dasein exists is itself. Heidegger insists, more than once, that this is "not at all an ontic assertion claiming that all existing humans in fact use or even should use all that surrounds them solely for their own particular egoistic aims" (MFL/186). The `self' Dasein chooses is an understanding that determines itself and all beings other than itself to be either tools or things-in-themselves.

> Many times, even ad nauseam, we pointed out that this being qua Dasein is always already with others

> and always already with beings not of Dasein's nature. In transcending, Dasein transcends every being, itself as well as every being of its own sort (Dasein-with) and every being not of Dasein's sort. In choosing itself Dasein really chooses precisely its being-with others and precisely its being among beings of a different character (MFL/190).

Dasein is unlike any other being because to no other being does there belong a world. But if the world or Being is such an issue for Dasein, in the sense that it defines who Dasein is, the reasons for choosing it strike at the very heart of human beings.

Because the ground of beings belongs to Dasein and determines its existence or how Dasein comes to be, the destiny of beings is tied up with the destiny of Dasein. When it comes to the question why ought one to be just,
Dasein therefore has an answer that is not clouded by practical concerns. Dasein does not compromise with justice and for this reason is often misunderstood. Dasein chooses justice (an understanding-of-Being) for itself and is without reason if by reason one means a psychological motivation.

2) Rosen argues that Heidegger does not have a doctrine or philosophical position. Heidegger would agree.

A doctrine of truth and a system of ethics are conventions or norms whose sustenance depends upon being deaf to the unique and individuating circumstances of existence. Platonism typically builds systems of ethics and then finds itself caught in the difficult question of how to apply its principles. It often turns out that a context which could

receive the principles does not exist and thus, although the problem has been diagnosed there is no way to solve it. Heidegger challenges the formulation of legislation whose very universalized conventionality makes it philosophically impractical. Being, to repeat, cannot be disclosed expect through the concrete. I qoute Heidegger on the `history of ideas',

> If we think about it, then of course what the unbiased eye sees is that the representation of history as the temporal actualization of supratemporal ideas and values does not stem from the experience of history (PR/95).

Ethical systems, like the history of ideas, are not grounded in the "experience of history." Heidegger rejects systems that stipulate what one ought and ought not to do in advance of an event. But that is not to say that for Heidegger there is nothing one should not do.

Heidegger distinguishes the real from the general sense of the word sophia. Generally it "means the ability to know one's way about in something, to be well-acquainted with something" (PDT/268). The general sense of the word, is to know one's way about objects with which we are familiar on a day to day basis, such as computers and interior designs. Generally, sophia refers to the calculating mode of the Platonist where beings are valued for ends outside of themselves. "But in a more real sense sophia means the ability to know one's way about in what is present as the unhidden and permanent as the present" (ibid.). The "real" sense of the word takes over

ontical truth. It listens beyond the empirical surface and understands beings on the basis of their ground. What one ought to do therefore depends upon one's ability to hear the measure of beings.

Heidegger writes of the purpose of existence,

> It assumes that it can somehow be decided objectively, while, in the final analysis, the sense of the question is such that it is, in each case, only the questioner alone who can pose the question in its real sense and answer it (MFL/185).

The purpose of existence can only be decided by oneself. It is a "question and affair of the individual person" (MFL/190). The reply Dasein makes to the `sending of Being' depends upon its choices, capability-to-be and situations that are beyond its control. Heidegger prepares the conditions with which to access the measure but does not say what the path of questioning will bring. With regard to the "metaphysics of existence" Heidegger remarks, "here the question of an ethics may properly be raised for the first time" (MFL/157).

3) As regards the basis of critical evaluation, I will first explain the notion of valuation, second the source and basis of critical evaluation, and third the limits and constraints upon critical-interpretation.

i) By valuation I mean ordering that is implicit to every `Why.' In reply to the question of Glaucon and Adeimantus, why one ought to be just, Socrates answered it by explaining what justice is. The why and what for is implicit to every `what.' The notion of valuation is tied up with the `what' in

Heidegger's philosophy in that, there is nothing that `is', that is not at the same time without a reason.

The unity of the why and the is, is found in Heidegger's philosophy at that point where the ground of beings is openned up and Dasein is faced with the choice of either being for itself or not. The choice itself refers directly to a why and a what for. Heidegger therefore says that the question "Why is there something rather than nothing" contains an element of preference for Dasein: the "rather than". "The concept of potius,`rather than', mallon, contains a moment of preference. We know possibilities of preference only in areas where there are decisions about value or lack of value, higher or lower value" (MFL/116). When Dasein brings a being into being as what it is, Dasein expresses why it is.

ii) The source of critical evaluation is nothing. The basis of critical evaluation is thinking-Being. Thinking conforms to Being, the measure with which one determines the truth of beings, to the extent that Dasein comports itself towards its own death.

> Death is the as yet unthought standard of measure of the unfathomable, which means, of the most elevated play in which humans are engaged in on earth, a play in which they are at stake (PR/112).

I have already explained how we are at stake in the question of the truth of beings. It is from an attunement to nothing, that Being is granted to thinking. Nothing or concealment is therefore prior to revealment. "What is lucid and light needs the obscure and shadowy, otherwise there would be nothing to

elucidate"(PR/9). Because concealment is prior to unconcealment, Dasein is able to take a standpoint to beings that is not only presuppositionless but intensely critical.

From the presuppositionless standpoint of nothingness, beings show themselves as they are but at the same time, Dasein is aware of how they could be otherwise. From the standpoint of nothing, Dasein realizes that what is, is formed through the contingencies of existence: circumstances, choices and a capability-to-be. From a presuppositionless standpoint Dasein understands that there is no necessity in anything being the way it is. Because of its continual awareness of how things could be otherwise, Dasein never takes anything for granted. Letting things slide is a sign of complacency and is not characteristic of one who questions and does so implicitly from an understanding-of-Being that is not visible. By going beyond what is said to what is left unsaid, and speaking what is presupposed, Dasein's interpretations, its bringing of Being to beings, is intensely critical.

iii) Dasein's critical-interpretations are constrained through the assimilation of its will to Being. It is through an openness to Being and thus an attentiveness to the ground out of which all beings come to be that Dasein is guided in the making of beings in Being. In the creation of a work of art, the artist is subordinated and under the power of art. Heidegger qoutes Bettina von Arnim,

> If one speaks of a movement [Satz] in music how it is performed, or of the accompaniment of an

> instrument and of the understanding with which it is treated, then I mean precisely the opposite, namely that the movement leads the musician, that the movement occurs, develops and is concentrated often enough till the spirit has completely joined itself to it (PR/89).

When one's skills respond to what is offered through a resolute opennes to Being, beings are brought-forth in Being. The art of making includes not only skills or know-how (techne) but includes care (melete), "the mastery of a composed and resolute openness to beings" (N/165).

But if Dasein is possessed and overtaken by Being in the creation of a work of art, how can Dasein be held responsible for what it says ? Heidegger does afterall say of Mozart, "The Lute Piece of God" (PR/168).

Dasein is responsible in that its speaking Being is a response. A response assumes responsibility for what it says but not for what it hears. Humans that speak from within and out of the present suffer their own wisdom. What is heard is not their own until they respond to it. Heidegger writes of the Greek dictum, "like is only known by like", that it means, "that which speaks to us only becomes perceivable through our response" (PR/48). Human beings are measured by their response to the `sending of Being.'

iii) Being-on-the-way:

The essence of truth is concealment. Concealment and unconcealment are not characteristics of Being. Were this the case, either one would have to be present in the absence of the other or else, like the mixing of the beautiful and the

ugly, their combination would destroy meaning. Heidegger points out that, "being is not a thing that some one of us takes away and puts to the side" and clarifies, "the essence of beings is such that, as a self-revealing, being reveals itself in a way such that a self-concealing - that means, a withdrawal - belongs to this revealing" (PR/70). It is not inconceivable that concealing belongs to revealing. The moment a being comes to stand as a determinate object of consciousness Being withdraws. Heidegger states that the "project of possibilities is, in its essence, `richer' than the possession of them; the latter rests on the former" (ER/111). The possibilities of Being cannot be exhausted in existence. With every determination of beings in Being, Being conceals itself. "Letting-be is intrinsically at the same time a concealing" (ET/132). While the difference between the ontic and the ontological, its bifurcated structure, is itself a way of sheltering Being from the creative will of human beings, because Being forever slips beyond the grasp of the subject, Heidegger has been accused of having a conception of Being that is empty. I will respond to the general protestation that Heidegger's thinking does not have a direction and will conclude by clarifying the ambiguity that surrounds the togetherness of truth and falsity in his thought.

a) That Heidegger's thought is on the way to nowhere fails to understand how circular reasoning is not static; that the recollective-leap forward uncovers breadths and depths of

meaning that grow.

The direction Heidegger gives thought cannot be defined in terms of a future that is somewhere `out there' and literally ahead of us anymore than it can be defined in terms of a superstructure projected forward from the past. Heidegger says of "recollectively forethinking", "It neither dwells on what has-been as a past represented by historiography, nor is it a representational thinking that stares with prophetical pretenses into a supposedly known future" (PR/94). The direction Heidegger's thought takes has the form of expanding circles. I explain this movement, inherent to transcendence as follows.

In the moment of leaping over itself Dasein is powerless and yet there is in this moment a creative upswing, elan or construction. The encounter with nothing is never absolute so long as Dasein exists. In recovering itself from nothing Dasein throws Being ahead and re-evaluates itself and beings other than itself from out of itself. In the leap the,

> mode of possible objectivity by which beings are grasped is completely left open and variable; there are different stages of possibility by which things themselves [Dinge selbst] are discoverable in the way they are in themselves [entdeckbar in ihrem An-sich-sein] (MFL/166).

Objectivity is not a static disclosure of beings but has degrees. Objectivity or the knowledge of beings as they are in themselves has `stages of possibility.' These `stages of possibility' I understand to be depths and breadths of meaning. In the act of transcendence the horizons of meaning

expand out of the depths or the abyss Dasein encounters and against which it is shattered. The more Dasein draws its own finitude and ignorance into itself, the more do the possible stages of meaning grow. These stages may be represented by circles or levels. Heidegger writes,

> The several possible levels and varieties of ontological truth in the broader sense reveal the richness of that which, as primordial truth, lies at the basis of all ontical truth (ER/27).

The "several possible levels and varities of ontological truth" grow according to the degree to which Dasein confronts its own depths. "A constantly renewed, that is, more and more original appropriation is needed in order for mortals to have a true beholding of something" (PR/46). Humans must constantly unveil the image behind which Being is hidden and in so doing they elaborate the truth of Being.

b) It at first seems perplexing but there is no truth without falsity or as it would be, authenticity without inauthenticity in Heidegger's philosophy.

Heidegger says "philosophical erudition or the emergence of a literature calling itself philosophical does not vouch for the existence of philosophy".

> But, in order to exist, everything genuine needs semblance. There is neither a philosophy, in all its purity, nor a sophistry with a complete monopoly. Both belong together in a particular historical "culture" which is possible in many diverse ways (MFL/212).

A literature about philosophy that calls itself philosophy is a semblance of philosophy but in order to exist everything

genuine needs semblance. How is it that everything genuine needs semblance ?

Everything genuine needs semblance otherwise it could not be genuine. Truth and falsity are alongside one another in Heidegger's philosophy. The concealment of Being that happens when beings are determined to be for a community of human action is alongside the unconcealment of Being. Indeed, concealment is the condition of unconcealment. Without concealment, Being could not come to shine. "... self-concealing of the essence of Being at the same time is precisely the manner that Being bestows itself, proffers itself to us in beings" (PR/54). Heidegger says of concealment,

> However, what brings into accord is not nothing but rather a concealing of beings as a whole. Precisely because letting be always lets beings be in a particular comportment which relates to them and thus discloses them, it conceals beings as a whole. Letting-be is intrinsically at the same time a concealing (ET/132).

The task of differentiating the being that comes to be under its own power from the being that is not self-determining demands of Dasein an attunement beyond the empirical surface to the reason of beings. The reason of beings or the essence of truth is a concealment of Being, that within and from which Being is disclosed.

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